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Controversy continues unabated over the question left unre-
solved by DeFunis v. Odegaard:1 whether in its admissions process
a state law school may accord preferential treatment to certain ra-
cial and ethnic minorities. In the pages of two journals published
by the University of Chicago, Professors John Hart Ely and Richard
Posner have established diametrically opposed positions in the de-
bate.2 Their contributions are of special interest because each un-
dertakes to answer the question within the framework of a theory
concerning the proper distribution of authority between the judici-
ary and the other institutions of government.
In the earlier article, Professor Ely defends the constitutionality
of racial preferences, essentially on the ground that the equal pro-
tection clause should not be read to prevent a majority from dis-
criminating between itself and a minority only to its own disadvan-
tage. The predicate for an active judicial role is lacking, Ely essays
to demonstrate, when the issue is whether a majority may "dis-
criminate against itself," and, he concludes, resolution of the issue
therefore ought to be left to the political process.'
Professor Posner, on the other hand, argues that the equal pro-
tection clause should be read to prohibit "the distribution of bene-
fits and costs by government on racial or ethnic grounds."4 Ironi-
cally, Posner defends this judicial limitation of legislative power in
part by arguing that a decision sustaining the constitutionality of
minority preferences would intolerably augment the power of the
judiciary to determine the direction of social policy. Courts must
limit legislative power, as it were, in the service of democratic
ideals.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
446 U.S. 312 (1974).
2 Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHi. L. REv. 723
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Ely]; Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of
Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1 [hereinafter cited as
Posner].
Ely at 727, 731-32.
Posner at 22.
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Neither position, in my judgment, adequately confronts the
problem of the judicial role in a democracy. The value choices Pos-
ner would have the courts eschew are inescapable if the equal pro-
tection clause is to be employed as a measure of legislative power.
Precisely because such choices are essential whenever the clause is
used to limit legislative power, however, appropriate sensitivity to
the values served by democratic decision-making requires courts to
defer to legislative judgments unless they clearly transgress consti-
tutional tradition. Nothing in American constitutional tradition
requires courts to deny legislatures the power to authorize preferen-
tial admissions policies for racial and ethnic minorities. The validity
of such policies depends only upon a judgment that they serve the
public welfare. The arguments that can be advanced to support
such a judgment are more than ample to sustain such an exercise
of legislative power.
The precise question posed by DeFunis and like cases, however,
is not whether preferential admissions policies are within the com-
petence of a legislature, but whether they are valid when adopted
by a university without explicit legislative sanction. There is, I shall
argue, a significant difference between these questions, and be-
cause of that difference existing racial preference programs draw
no support from Ely's analysis. Although there is good reason to
sustain preferential policies in any event, the grounds for such a
judgment are far less compelling than they would be if the policies
had received explicit legislative approval.
I. THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF EQUAL PROTECTION
A decision whether government may adopt a policy of explicitly
preferential treatment of racial and ethnic minorities requires a
painful choice between ideals to which American society has devel-
oped a deep commitment, deeper than many of its critics assume.
On the one hand, such a policy seems inconsistent not only with the
nation's rejection of racism 5 but with concepts of individuality and
merit that are even more deeply rooted in Western culture. A rejec-
tion of minority preferences, on the other hand, seemingly threatens
5 The suggestion that there has been a rejection of racism may seem overstated. Racial
sentiment is obviously of continuing significance in the United States, a fact which I shall
argue has an important bearing upon the question whether minority preferences ought to be
held permissible under the equal protection clause. See text and notes at notes 93-106 infra.
Nevertheless, evidence of the rejection of racism in American society is everywhere and
overwhelming: in the mass of legislation against racial discrimination, in judicial decisions,
in literature and schoolbooks, in the media of mass communications, and in the rhetoric of
political leaders.
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both humanitarian and egalitarian ideals which also have deep roots
in Western culture.
In discussing so vexing an issue, it is useful to begin with funda-
mentals, even at the risk of restating the obvious. The constitutional
guarantee of "the equal protection of the laws," to begin at such a
point, does not mean that everyone must be treated equally. The
state may tax some individuals at a high rate, some at a low rate,
and some not at all. It may maintain a system of publicly supported
higher education which admits as students only those who meet
established criteria. A prime function of law, indeed, is to mark out
the bases for discrimination by government in its relations with the
citizenry.
What the equal protection clause does require, stated in the
most general terms, is that government treat similarly all those who
are similarly situated.6 But as the literature of moral philosophy
articulates more clearly than the literature of the law, the principle
of similar treatment for those similarly situated-Aristotle's princi-
ple of distributive justice -merely states a formal relationship.8
Standing alone, it is insufficient to decide any case because it does
not indicate how to determine when individuals are similarly situ-
ated. All individuals are similar in some respects and different in
others. The question that must be answered before it can be deter-
mined whether "the equal protection of the laws" requires similar
treatment of different individuals is whether the differences among
them ought to be taken into account. What is required, in other
words, is a material or substantive principle, a standard by which
to determine when the differences among individuals justify treat-
ing them differently.
Now the principle of similar treatment of those similarly situ-
ated is merely a prescription for rational behavior and, in that sense,
value-free.9 But the material principles which determine whether
individuals are similarly or differently situated necessarily rest upon
value choices. A decision whether individuals are similarly or differ-
ently situated cannot be made "without positing a certain scale of
values, a determination of what is important and what is not. It is
our view of the world, the way we distinguish what has value from
6 Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 344
(1949).
NICOMACHEANETHics, Bk. V.
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 153-63 (1961); C. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF
JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 1-87 (1963).
1 See text at notes 13-14 infra.
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what has none,"'" that leads us to conclude whether individuals are
similarly or differently situated. Controversy concerning the mean-
ing of the equal protection clause is a product of disagreement not
only about those values, but about how and by whom they ought to
be determined.
When the issue is whether the administration of law comports
with equal protection, the demands imposed by the concept of equal
protection are clear. The material principle is provided by the law.
Equal protection consists of adherence to its terms. If, for example,
the law prescribes a ten percent tax on the income of all individuals,
the principle of similar treatment for those similarly situated would
be violated by a tax collector who levied a fifteen (or a five) percent
tax only on blacks. The violation does not depend upon the use of a
racial classification (either to the advantage or disadvantage of
blacks), but upon the statute's stipulation that income differences
alone are relevant to a determination of the taxes that individuals
must pay. Thus, the principle of similar treatment for those simi-
larly situated would also be violated if the tax collector were to levy
a tax greater (or less) than ten percent upon the income of all indi-
viduals who have assets in excess of one million dollars. By stipulat-
ing that income differences are the only differences to be taken into
account in determining taxes, the lawmaker has ruled out consider-
ation of other differences, however much it might be wished that the
tax collector were free to consider them. Wealth and race are equally
irrelevant, not because either is in some sense intrinsically irrele-
vant to taxation, but because they have been made so by a particu-
lar material principle-the statute.
The meaning of the equal protection clause is much less clear
when the validity of legislation is at issue. A claim that legislation
denies the equal protection of the laws is an assertion that the
legislation treats differently individuals who are similarly situated.
Since the individuals are in fact different and the legislation does
distinguish among them, the claim must be that there is a principle
extrinsic to the legislation in virtue of which the affected individuals
must be deemed similarly situated.' But since that extrinsic princi-
ple cannot be derived from the formal principle of similar treatment
for those similarly situated, the claim must be that the equal protec-
tion clause embodies one or more material principles from which it
can be determined whether persons are similarly situated.1 2 Yet
10 C. PERELMAN, supra note 8, at 27.
Cf. H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 157.
12 Other provisions of the Constitution might be invoked to support a conclusion that
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nothing in the language of the equal protection clause suggests the
values that ought to be given expression by a substantive reading
of the clause.
The use of the equal protection clause as a measure of the
validity of legislation is thus attended by difficulties similar to those
encountered when the due process clause is given substantive mean-
ing. Judgment depends upon principles that are necessarily value-
laden, principles that are an expression of views concerning the
appropriate role of government in the society and, ultimately,
proper ends of the society. No doubt, such premises are necessary
whenever the constitution is invoked to limit legislative power. Ju-
dicial review has been a persistent source of controversy for precisely
that reason. The democratic commitment of our age requires-or at
least has seemed to many to require-that important value choices
rest with institutions that are more politically responsible than the
courts. The judiciary's warrant for curbing legislative power is espe-
cially vulnerable when the limits that are imposed depend upon
giving substantive meaning to the due process or equal protection
clauses. The absence of a textual foundation for whatever substan-
tive principles are proposed to be read into those clauses diminishes
the likelihood that the necessary value choices are rooted in consti-
tutional tradition and thereby weakens whatever claim the judiciary
might have for withdrawing those choices from the other institu-
tions of government. I do not mean to suggest that a substantive
reading of the due process and equal protection clauses can never
certain characteristics must be ignored in determining whether persons are similarly situated.
But then, as the late Justice Harlan pointed out in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 659,
661-62 (1969) (dissenting opinion), the equal protection clause adds nothing to the analysis
of a statute's validity. For example, if the religion clauses of the first amendment forbid
consideration of religious affiliation, there is no need to invoke the equal protection clause in
order to invalidate legislation that differentiates upon the basis of such affiliation. See also
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 100 n.59 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
The equal protection claim is not similarly redundant when the material principle is
derived from state legislation and the claim under the equal protection clause is that dissimi-
lar treatment has been accorded individuals who are similarly situated under the legislation.
To be sure, the equal protection claim raises the same issue as the claim that the statute has
been violated. The claim that the statute has been violated, however, does not raise a federal
question and, hence, would be beyond the competence of a federal court. The equal protection
clause functions in these cases to give federal courts jurisdiction over claims that state law
has not been administered in accordance with its terms. See, e.g., Raymond v. Chicago
Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20 (1907). Not surprisingly, the extraordinary potential of this analysis
for expanding federal review of the administration of state law has led the Supreme Court to
formulate limiting doctrines, such as the doctrine that equal protection is not denied unless
the failure to apply state law according to its term is systematic or intentional. See Snowden
v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
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be justified, but reasonable sensitivity to the values of democratic
decision-making counsels that the courts proceed cautiously in
reading those clauses to limit the choices available to government,
especially the choices available to government in devising remedies
for pressing social problems.
Perhaps because the justification for reading the equal protec-
tion clause as enacting any particular material principle is so prob-
lematic, equal protection analysis is often cast in terms that appear
to obviate the need for such a principle. The Supreme Court has
frequently stated, for example, that legislation offends the clause if
there is no rational basis for the dissimilar treatment accorded dif-
ferent individuals.'3 The emphasis upon rationality in this formula-
tion may make it appear that there is no need for a material princi-
ple and, thus, that it is possible to determine the validity of legisla-
tion under the equal protection clause without making the value
judgments that inhere in such a principle. The appearance is decep-
tive. A determination whether there is a rational basis for the legis-
lative classification involves precisely the same inquiry as the deter-
mination whether the affected individuals are differently situated.14
It would be irrational to decide differently two cases that are identi-
cal in all respects. But since no two cases are truly identical, the
question of rationality is inseparable from the question of which
differences are significant. Whether a legislative classification is
rational depends upon a showing that individuals who are accorded
different treatment are differently situated. And whether individu-
als are differently situated depends upon which differences are
judged important in virtue of a particular material principle.
Judicial opinions are frequently written, nevertheless, to make
it appear that the "rational basis" test can be employed without
introducing an extrinsic material principle, simply by ascertaining
whether the disparate treatment accorded individuals is justified by
the purpose of the legislation. 5 The implicit claim is that a material
principle is provided by the purpose of the legislation and that the
judicial role is confined to ascertaining whether the means chosen
by the legislature is rationally related to its objective. The attrac-
" See, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
I' Cf. J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 99 (1973).
' See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-
76 (1971); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 563,567 (1931). At times, it is said that the question
is whether the classification can be justified by a permissible legislative purpose. See, e.g.,
Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964). The qualification, of course, intro-
duces an extrinsic material principle.
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tiveness of this approach to equal protection determinations is ob-
vious.'" Material principles rest upon judgments of value that are
often controversial. Unless a particular choice of values is prescribed
by constitutional tradition, a judicial determination seems incom-
patible with the nation's commitment to democratic decision-
making. Invoking the purpose of the legislation seemingly avoids
this difficulty by resting the determination whether individuals are
similarly or differently situated upon a material principle-and
therefore upon a choice of values-prescribed by the legislature. The
role of the courts is limited to ascertaining whether the legislature
has been true to its purpose. Public policy and the determination
of social goals are left to the elected representatives of the people.
The flaw in this approach is that it cannot explain any decision
invalidating legislation without attributing to the legislature a pur-
pose distinct from that revealed by the terms of the legislation it has
enacted.17 When the cases in which the approach has been employed
to invalidate legislation are fully analyzed, it is apparent that an
extrinsic material principle implicitly underlies each of the deci-
sions. In Smith v. Cahoon,'8 for example, the Supreme Court used
the equal protection clause to invalidate a statute that required a
security bond to be posted by all motor carriers except those trans-
porting agricultural goods and certain seafoods. The Court had no
doubt that increasing public security was a valid legislative pur-
pose, but it held that there was no difference between carriers sub-
ject to the requirement and those exempt from it in relation to that
purpose. If public security had been the legislature's only objective,
the exemptions would indeed have been irrational in treating differ-
ently persons who, for this purpose, were similarly situated."9
But the very irrationality of the exemption on this supposition
suggests that an increase in public security was not the only legisla-
tive objective. The mere existence of the exemption indicates that
the legislature also intended to avoid placing additional burdens on
the agricultural and seafood industries. The purpose of the legisla-
" See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 17 (1972).
," See generally Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE
L.J. 123 (1972) [hereinafter cited as YALE NoTE].
l 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
" See H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 158-59, J. FEINBERG, supra note 14, at 105. This
conclusion is subject to the possibility that there may have been certain factual differences
between the exempt carriers and all other carriers, e.g., that the former were more financially
responsible or employed more careful drivers. The Court mentions no such factual justifica-
tion.
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tion, in other words, was to increase public security without impos-
ing additional costs on two favored industries. And in relation to
that purpose the statutory classification was entirely rational. If the
exemption in Smith v. Cahoon violated the equal protection clause
it must therefore have been for some reason other than the irration-
ality of the statutory classification.
The inability of a "means-ends" analysis to explain the result
in Smith v. Cahoon is not a consequence of factors unique to that
case. All legislation that raises equal protection issues involves an
accommodation of competing goals, each of which acts as a con-
straint upon the maximization of the others. None of the goals,
standing alone, comprehends the purpose of the legislature, for that
purpose is to achieve an optimal balance among competing goals.
The potential multiplicity of legislative objectives means that it will
always be possible to draw from the terms of a statute legislative
purposes to which the statutory classification is rationally related.
The burdens or benefits created by a statute suggest at the very
least a purpose to burden or benefit all those who share the classify-
ing characteristic. The statutory classification must be rationally
related to that purpose because the purpose has been derived from
the classification. "Legislative purpose so defined is nearly tautolog-
ical but it also is the purpose suggested by the plain terms of a
statute."2 A conclusion that legislation offends the equal protection
clause cannot, therefore, be grounded solely upon a determination
that the classifications employed in the legislation are not rationally
related to the purpose of the legislation. Some extrinsic principle is
needed to justify the conclusion that those to whom the legislature
has accorded different treatment are, for constitutional purposes,
similarly situated.
The need for such a principle is, however, a good deal more
obvious than the warrant for any particular principle. 2 Although
2 YALE NoTE, supra note 17, at 128.
2 In Smith v. Cahoon, for example, the Court may have implicitly determined that
favoritism to the agricultural and seafood industries was not a permissible legislative objec-
tive. Assuming that the statutory classification could not have been supported by any other
objective, the statute would then have violated the equal protection clause by according
different treatment to carriers similarly situated in relation to permissible legislative objec-
tives. The constitutional warrant for a principle precluding such favoritism is not obvious,
however. To read into the Constitution a requirement that legislation serve interests more
general than those of particular social and economic groups would intolerably augment the
power of the judiciary to determine social policy. Surely Professor Posner is correct in suggest-
ing that "[t]he real 'justification' for most legislation is simply that it is the product of the
constitutionally created political process of our society." Posner at 29; cf. J. THAYER, LEGAL
ESSAYS 80 (1908). Even if so dubious-principle were read into the Constitution, the ques-
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the Supreme Court has in recent years frequently invoked the equal
protection clause to invalidate legislation, it has not carefully con-
sidered the problem of justifying the material principles upon which
those decisions rest. Several members of the Court, led by Mr. Jus-
tice Marshall, have urged that material principles can be derived
from values expressed by other constitutional provisions." A major-
ity of the justices have rejected that position but have failed to
advance any other.23 Whatever the merits of Justice Marshall's
theory in the cases to which it applies, a substantial number of the
Court's recent equal protection decisions rest upon material princi-
ples that cannot conceivably be drawn from other provisions of the
Constitution.24 The consequence is that we lack a substantive theory
of equal protection-a theory that would define the interests that
the clause protects and thereby confine its reach.
Professor Posner's argument in support of the principle that
race is not a permissible criterion of governmental action, as dis-
cussed more fully below,25 rests largely upon his belief in the need
for such a theory. The desire for such a theory is readily understand-
able. In its absence, there seems no alternative to resting equal
protection determinations upon an assessment of the gains and
losses resulting from the challenged legislation, with the judiciary
exercising ultimate authority for determining what is a "gain" and
what is a "loss." The opportunity thus conferred upon the judiciary
to substitute its judgment for the legislature's on the relative merits
of competing social goals is, after the past two decades, not simply
a matter of conjecture. Yet, unless the courts are to abandon use of
the equal protection clause as a measure of the validity of legisla-
tion, a move toward which neither the Supreme Court nor its critics
seems disposed, weighing the relative merits of competing social
goals is an inescapable element of adjudication. There is no way,
apart from choosing among such goals, that the courts can deter-
tion whether the broader public interest is promoted by an implicit subsidy to certain indus-
tries is surely too intractable for adjudication in a constitutional setting. See YALE NoTE,
supra note 17, at 144.
22 See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-03 (1973) (dissenting
opinion).
21 Id. at 29-39 (opinion of the Court).
24 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Department of Agric. v. Mor-
eno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972);
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). Other decisions rest upon material principles that
are at best tenuously related to other constitutional provisions. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970).
21 See text and notes at notes 71-89 infra.
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mine whether those who have received different treatment at the
hands of the legislature are, for constitutional purposes, to be
deemed similarly situated.
Nor is it feasible, over time, to confine the Court's role by
adopting a theory which once and for all specifies the particular
values that are to be accorded protection under the equal protection
clause. Social change is inevitably accompanied by change in social
values. "Any moral, social or political evolution leading to a modifi-
cation in the scale of values," as the moral philosopher Chaim Perel-
man has written, "will at the same time modify the characteristics
regarded as essential for the application of [the principle of similar
treatment for those similarly situated] .''2 The emergence of new
values and the falling away of older ones leads to a continuous
redefinition of the categories by which men perceive themselves and
to continuous reassessment of the significance that they attribute
to those categories. A theory of equal protection that prescribes
unchanging categories must, over time, prove to be both too restric-
tive and insufficiently restrictive of legislative power. 21
The necessity for choice among competing values in formulat-
ing the material principles required to give effect to the equal pro-
tection clause need not be taken as a carte blanche for the courts to
substitute their judgment for that of the legislature on any and all
issues of social policy. An awareness that judgments concerning the
relative merits of competing public policies underlie the principles
employed to determine whether individuals are similarly or differ-
ently situated may, indeed, temper the temptation for judges to
substitute their judgments for those of the legislature. The more the
value predicates of decision are brought to the fore, the more a court
sensitive to the full range of values to which the Constitution gives
expression will hesitate to upset a deliberate legislative choice. For
among the values to which the Constitution gives expression are
those associated with decision-making by politically responsible in-
stitutions. To be sure, "democratic" values are not the only values
embodied in the Constitution, and constitutional tradition permits
the courts to override legislative choice in the service of other goals.
Yet due regard for "democratic" values requires that legislative
2 C. PERELMAN, supra note 8, at 27.
" I do not mean to suggest that it is unnecessary to have a theory prescribing how to
determine the values that are to be given expression through the equal protection clause. The
Court's failure to develop such a theory, during a period of intense use of the clause, has left
the law of equal protection in intellectual disarray. My point, rather, is that it would be
unwise to adopt a theory of equal protection that purports to specify for the indefinite future
the particular values to be protected.
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decisions be overridden only when those decisions are inconsistent
with values society has come to view as fundamental.
The means by which the Court can accommodate these demo-
cratic values with the need to recognize evolution in the values to
be accorded constitutional protection is, of course, the great ques-
tion of constitutional law, a question which is not uniquely posed
by the equal protection clause. In the concluding section of this
paper, I want to suggest the beginnings-barely more than a hint
-of an approach to that question. Before that, however, I want to
show that constitutional tradition does not require that the equal
protection clause be read to prohibit state-supported colleges and
universities from adopting an admissions policy that accords prefer-
ential treatment to racial and ethnic minorities.
II. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
Professor Posner argues that the equal protection clause should
be read to prohibit "the distribution of benefits and costs by govern-
ment on racial or ethnic grounds."2s The intense controversy that
has developed over the use of minority preferences demonstrates the
lack of a societal consensus concerning the wisdom of such prefer-
ences. In the absence of a consensus, justification for a principle
that would withdraw the controversy from the normal processes of
political settlement depends, minimally, upon the persuasiveness of
one of three lines of argument: (1) the principle expresses the inten-
tions of those responsible for the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment;21 (2) the principle can be derived from another, more general,
and concededly valid principle of constitutional law; or (3) the prin-
ciple must be recognized because it is necessary to justify other
decisions that the Court would feel required to make under the
21 Posner, supra note 2, at 22. Posner's principle extends beyond preferential admissions
policies, prohibiting all consideration of race by government. In arguing that the principle
ought not to be adopted by the Supreme Court, I do not mean to suggest that any "benign"
use of a racial criterion ought to be sustained. Since the question whether different persons
should be deemed similarly situated can be answered only in relation to the consequences of
a course of action, the validity of a racial classification depends upon an evaluation of the
consequences attendant upon its use. The consequences will, of course, differ for different
governmental programs. See Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the
Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, Nw. U.L. REv. 363 (1966). The argument pre-
sented here may, of course, have some relevance in determining the validity of preferential
treatment for minorities in other programs, but I have made no effort to think through all
the problems for programs other than admission to institutions of higher education.
21 It is unnecessary to consider the extent to which "the intention of the draftsmen" alone
can justify a constitutional principle because, as Posner concedes, the framers of the four-
teenth amendment did not intend to imbed the principle he proposes in the Constitution.
See text at notes 30-32 infra.
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Constitution. Posner's principle cannot, in my judgment, be
persuasively supported by any one of these arguments.
A. The "Legislative" History of the Equal Protection Clause
The framers of the fourteenth amendment plainly did not in-
tend to prohibit the states from employing a racial criterion to the
advantage of the black population. Posner himself points out that
"[s]o bizarre would discrimination against whites in admission to
institutions of higher learning have seemed to the framers of the
[fjourteenth [a]mendment that we can be confident that they did
not consciously seek to erect a constitutional barrier against such
discrimination."' " Nor did they have the broader intention of pro-
hibiting all consideration of race by government. Thus, "it is equally
clear," as Posner concedes, "that the framers did not contemplate
that the [a]mendment would compel equal treatment of blacks in
public education" 31-or in a number of other areas either.32 The
notion lately advanced by the Supreme Court and repeated by some
commentators, that "[t]he clear and central purpose of the
[f]ourteenth [a]mendment was to eliminate all official state
sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States,"3 is simply
an anachronism-an attribution to the framers of the amendment
of views that did not achieve currency until much later.
The idea that black and white are equal, that race is not a
meaningful category, did not begin to gain ascendancy until well
into the present century.34 Ideas that today would be labelled rac-
ist-the word did not exist in the nineteenth century-were during
the nineteenth century the common property of the white popula-
tion, North and South, educated and uneducated, slaveholder and
abolitionist. Disagreements existed, of course, but the dominant
sentiment of the time accorded race a significance that today, after
the revolution in attitude during the past fifty years, seems almost
beyond comprehension. Racial differences were perceived as funda-
mental, enduring and, almost always, reflecting the innate superior-
ity of the white population. 31
31 Posner, supra note 2, at 21-22.
1, Id. at 22.
3'2 See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 58 (1955).
31 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967). See also Cohen, Race and the Constitution,
220 THE NATION 135, 138-39 (1975).
31 G. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 325-32 (1971); T. GossEr, RACE
409-59 (1963); L. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY (1961).
31 See G. FREDERICKSON, supra note 34; T. GOSSET, supra note 34.
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In the intellectual milieu of the nineteenth century, the domi-
nant question was not whether the races were different, but the
significance of the fact that they were. During the years immedi-
ately following the Civil War, there was substantial sentiment, cen-
tered in the radical wing of the Republican party, that whatever
differences might exist between blacks and whites were not relevant
to their equality before the law. "[T]he question presented in these
discussions," said Representative Baldwin of Massachusetts during
debate on Reconstruction legislation, "is not a question concerning
the equality or the inequality of human races . . . .[I]t is a ques-
tion concerning human rights. It calls upon us to decide whether
men shall be equal before the law and have equality in their rela-
tions to the Government of their country. '36 But, as the late Profes-
sor Alexander Bickel demonstrated in his study of the origins of the
equal protection clause, the radical Republicans were unable to
carry their point." A rule that race was never to serve as a legally
relevant category could not have gained the assent of the country,
for it would have opened too wide a gap between the law and the
understanding of the time.
The purpose of the clause was narrower, to gain for blacks
equality with whites in respect of certain rights that were deemed
necessary incidents of their status as free men. Mr. Justice Miller,
writing for the Court shortly after the adoption of the Civil War
amendments, stated the intention precisely in attributing to all of
the amendments the "pervading purpose" of guaranteeing
the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establish-
ment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made
freeman and citizen from the oppression of those who had for-
merly exercised unlimited dominion over him.38
Freedom, not equality, was the purpose of the equal protection
clause.
This "legislative" history does not require rejection of the prin-
ciple proposed by Professor Posner; the point is, rather, that it does
not require adoption of that principle. As Posner suggests, the provi-
sions of the constitution ought not to be confined to the precise
meaning intended by their framers. But if it is undesirable to be
governed by the past, it is worse to be ruled by a misconception of
39 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 456 (1868). See generally G. FREDERICKSON,
supra note 34, at 178-93.
' Bickel, supra note 32.
" Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873).
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the past. And only a misconception of the past leads to the conclu-
sion that it imposes upon government an obligation of "color-
blindness."
An understanding of the origins of the equal protection clause
is useful also because it provides an historical illustration of the
point, developed analytically in the first section of this paper, that
the guarantee of "the equal protection of the laws" is only an affir-
mation of other values, of goals that must be determined indepen-
dently of the rule of equality and, therefore, that require indepen-
dent justification.3 9 The framers of the fourteenth amendment
accepted as an overriding value that blacks, solely by reason of their
humanity, were entitled to be free. In that respect they were similar
to whites and, therefore, entitled to similar treatment in respect of
what were then conceived to be the necessary incidents of freedom.
But blacks and whites were not perceived as alike in all respects,
nor were all relationships between citizens and government thought
to involve the value of freedom. When freedom and its incidents
were not involved, there were other values, such as the intelligent
discharge of civic obligations, in respect of which blacks and whites
were thought not to be similarly situated and in respect of which
discrimination was, therefore, justified. The goals the framers
sought to achieve thus determined for them when racial discrimina-
tion was to be permissible. Today, similarly, a decision about
whether racial discrimination is permissible will be determined by
what we seek to accomplish.
B. The Validity of Classification by Involuntary Characteristics
A second way of justifying a principle is to demonstrate that it
can be derived from a more general and concededly valid principle.
The only readily apparent principle from which Posner's principle
might derive is the suggestion by several members of the Supreme
Court that classification on the basis of characteristics that are
adventitious and immutable is, if not necessarily invalid, at least
constitutionally suspect." The impulse that gives rise to this sugges-
tion is not difficult to make out. It seems unfair that the burdens
and benefits of social life, especially those distributed by govern-
ment, should be apportioned among individuals on the basis of
qualities over which they lack control. The denial of schooling to
2' See also C. PERELMAN, supra note 8, at 55.
40 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion); cf.
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
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children because of their skin color or sex, the limitation of public
office to certain families, and other familiar examples from history
and literature suggest the force behind that idea. Ideally, these
illustrations might be taken to suggest, distribution of the burdens
and benefits of social life ought to bear some relationship to respon-
sibility and merit.4" Yet, prevailing notions of responsibility and
merit are intimately bound up with the opportunity for choice4 2 that
is denied individuals when government classifies them on the basis
of involuntary characteristics.
Professor Posner disclaims any reliance on this broader princi-
ple, however. As he correctly points out, a court could not consis-
tently apply the principle that "no involuntary characteristic
should ever be used as a criterion of public regulation. 4 3 The situa-
tions are too numerous in which the values of our society call for
attention to involuntary characteristics. Those values may require
efforts to cultivate (by incentives or otherwise) the use of what are,
in part, genetic characteristics, as when rewards or special training
are given to the intellectually gifted or those of unusual physical
prowess. Humanitarian considerations may suggest special consid-
eration for the needs of those who suffer from an involuntary
disability, say, by devoting a larger amount of resources to the edu-
cation of handicapped children than to the education of other chil-
dren. Surely, none of these policies would be held by a court to be
beyond governmental competence,44 as recognized even in the opin-
ions that suggest the illegitimacy of classification by adventitious,
immutable characteristics. In such situations, it is explained, the
classifying characteristic is relevant to a legitimate governmental
purpose." But that formula, of course, is the test for the validity of
all classifications, not merely those which rest upon adventitious
For a critique of this view, see J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 310-15 (1971).
42 See I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 63-81 (1969).
" Posner, supra note 2, at 23. See also Ely, supra note 2, at 730 n.36.
Of course, the suggested principle holds only that classifications that rest upon adven-
titious, immutable characteristics are constitutionally suspect, not that they are necessarily
invalid. The principle is nevertheless unsatisfactory if "constitutionally suspect" is under-
stood as a term of art that triggers all the consequences outlined in the Supreme Court's
opinions. See, e.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969). The virtual certainty that the Court would not
hold discrimination in favor of handicapped children to be "suspect" suggests that what
renders a classification "suspect" is not the nature of the criteria that are employed but the
nature of the class that is disadvantaged. Cf. Note, The Right of Handicapped Children to
an Education: The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 CORNELL L. Rav. 519 (1974). Adequate conside-
ration of that possibility is beyond the scope of this paper, but the analysis in the concluding
section suggests some of the issues raised by it.
11 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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and immutable characteristics. The accidental, unchangeable char-
acter of the classifying criteria adds nothing to the argument.
I am not at all certain, however, that this analysis fully disposes
of the issue. Although a court could not consistently maintain the
position that classification by involuntary characteristics is consti-
tutionally impermissible, or even suspect, the use of such criteria in
many situations does seem to violate some shared sense of fairness.
There are two ways to account for these seemingly discordant con-
clusions. First, it may be that in the latter situations-of which the
illustrations given earlier may be taken as representative 4 -
something other than the adventitious and immutable nature
of the criteria employed underlies the conclusion that they are
objectionable. The fact that the characteristic used in classifying
people is adventitious and immutable would, if such an argument
could be established, be irrelevant in determining whether the clas-
sification is permissible. An alternative analysis would start with
the proposition that the involuntary nature of a criterion of classifi-
cation counts against its legitimacy, but then recognize that there
are other values to be taken into account that may at times require
the use of such a criterion." An examination of these alternative
analyses will help illuminate the issues posed by minority prefer-
ences.
Hostility to the use of involuntary characteristics to classify
people may have a subtle historical explanation. Classification by
such characteristics has frequently been used to perpetuate the
dominant political, economic, or social position of certain groups.
It thus seems reasonable to suppose that attitudes toward the use
of involuntary characteristics have been colored by the fact that
their use has often been at war with the egalitarian ideals that have
dominated the modern age.48 The influence of egalitarian ideals
upon our attitudes toward sorting people on the basis of adventi-
48 See text and notes at notes 40-41 supra.
" Although the latter analysis resembles the argument that classification by adventi-
tious, immutable characteristics is constitutionally suspect, there are significant differences
between the two analyses. The purpose of the "suspect classification" doctrine is to require
a high degree of justification for classifications held to be "suspect" and to impose upon the
courts the obligation of determining whether that justification has been established. The
analysis set forth in the text, however, indicates neither how to weigh values nor who should
perform the balancing.
48 "Egalitarian" is used here in the broadest possible sense as an expression of the view
that all persons are of equal dignity and worth. It thus encompasses the liberal ideals of
"equality before the law" and "equality of opportunity" as well as various leveling theories
which under some circumstances may be in competition with them. For a survey of the
competing theories, see LAKOFF, EqUALrrY IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1964).
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tious circumstances is suggested also by the toleration for-perhaps
insistence upon-such a sorting criterion when egalitarian ideals are
served thereby. When life itself is at stake, for example, the funda-
mental equality of all humans-their equal dignity and worth-has
at times seemed to require that the choice of who shall live and who
shall die be left to chance. "In no other way," as the court reasoned
in United States v. Holmes, the famous lifeboat case, "are those
having equal rights put upon an equal footing. . .. ""
Now whatever other objections there may be to the preferences
that recently have been accorded racial and ethnic minorities, it is
obvious that those preferences do not serve to maintain a position
of dominance for the preferred groups. Not only are the groups given
preferential treatment among the least advantaged in the society in
terms of political, economic and social status, but it is precisely
their disadvantaged status that has provided the primary rationale
for preferential treatment. An important reason for the suspicion
with which classification by involuntary personal characteristics is
viewed is therefore inapplicable when preference is given to racial
and ethnic minorities.
Yet the objection to classification by involuntary characteris-
tics does not seem to rest solely upon the use of such criteria to serve
nonegalitarian objectives. Legislation that excluded left-handed
children from kindergarten would, if unsupported by further justifi-
cation, undoubtedly be universally condemned as unjust and invali-
dated by the Supreme Court as a denial of equal protection 5 even
1' 26 Fed. Cas. 360, 367 (No. 15,383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842). But cf. The Queen v. Dudley
and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 285-88 (1884). The selection criterion in these situations is not,
of course, a personal characteristic, but that does not appear to be a significant difference.
In any situation in which selection by lottery would be acceptable, classification by an
adventitious characteristic ought to be equally acceptable if the latter is randomly distributed
over the entire population. Illustratively, assume that a life-saving drug temporarily in short
supply can be made available only to 20 percent of the persons whose medical needs require
it. If a lottery is acceptable as a means of selection, it ought also to be acceptable to employ
instead an adventitious characteristic (say, left-handedness) which occurs in 20 percent of
the population if it is uncorrelated with race, sex, wealth, political power or any other personal
characteristic of social significance. The major argument for using a lottery, rather than a
personal characteristic, is that the selection of a personal characteristic may be influenced
by knowledge of the characteristics of particular individuals. But this merely emphasizes that
we wish to assure chance selection, not avoid it.
Another plausible argument supporting a lottery is that use of a personal characteristic
to classify, especially if it is used repeatedly over long periods, may create new class divisions
in the society, thereby frustrating the original egalitarian objective. That danger, however,
is not uniquely associated with the use of involuntary characteristics, although it is possible
that the danger is greater when such criteria are employed.
50 The legislation cannot be justifiably invalidated on the ground that left-handedness
is irrelevant to the legislative purpose in establishing kindergartens. The legislative purpose
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though the classification neither perpetuated nor created long-term
class consequences. The objection to such legislation would, I think,
proceed somewhat along the following lines: one goal of a good so-
ciety is to enlarge the opportunities of individuals to cultivate and
express their individuality, to facilitate each individual's opportun-
ity to pursue a personal conception of the good life. It is the goal to
which Jefferson referred when he wrote that "Governments are in-
stituted among men" to secure their right to "the pursuit of Happi-
ness." Distribution of opportunities on the basis of involuntary
characteristics is incompatible with that goal because the claim of
each person to pursue his conception of the good life ought to be
given similar consideration." Perhaps individuals who make a
greater effort ought to receive greater consideration, but the fact
that one individual differs from another by reason of race, sex,
height, or another involuntary characteristic seems an insufficient
reason for regarding him as more or less worthy of consideration. If
opportunities are in short supply, it might thus be argued, they
ought to be rationed on a basis that bears some relationship to the
goal of enhancing the ability of individuals to develop their individ-
uality. So, for example, if there are fewer vacancies in universities
than applicants for admission, preference might be given to those
applicants whose objectives would best be served by a university
education or to those whose past efforts revealed a more intense
desire to be educated. Chance would thus be eliminated and oppor-
tunities awarded on a basis which accords with desert.
The obvious response to this argument is that there is no appar-
ent means of making the judgments called for by such criteria. No
calculus exists for determining whether one person's or another's
objectives would be better served by access to higher education. Nor
are there adequate measures of relative intensity of desire or means
by which to determine the extent to which differences in past per-
formance are attributable to effort or to factors, such as native
endowment, that are beyond individual control. Measurement is
not the only difficulty, moreover. The relationship between adventi-
tious characteristics and individual choice is uncertain. Past effort
may be no more than a product of adventitious circumstances, a
consequence not merely (and perhaps not at all) of individual will
in this instance would not be to prepare children for school, but to prepare right-handed
children. An extrinsic material principle must be introduced to account for the conclusion
that exclusion of left-handed children is impermissible. See text and notes at notes 15-24
supra.
11 Cf. W. FRANKENA, SOME BELIEFS ABOUT JUSTICE, THE LINDLEY LECTURE, UNIV. OF KAN-
SAS, DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY PAMPHLET 10, 14-20 (1966).
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but of the family in which one chanced to be born and of natural
endowment which offered promise that effort would be worthwhile.2
The same may be true of desire.
Thus, the same reasons offered to justify the conclusion that
minority preferences are unjust may also be offered to support a
conclusion that it would be equally unjust to admit to universities
those applicants displaced by the minority preference: though race
and ethnicity are adventitious, and hence irrelevant to desert, the
same is true of natural endowment and childhood environment,
important determinants of success on admission tests and in prior
academic pursuits. If use of the former is to be viewed with suspicion
because they ignore desert, it is not obvious why use of the latter
ought not to be viewed with similar suspicion.
Pushed to the extreme, this line of reasoning threatens the
premise with which we began. If individuals are solely a product of
forces beyond their control, it is meaningless to posit as a social goal
the enlargement of opportunities for them to develop their individu-
ality. All individual goals, desires and efforts would be adventitious
from the perspective of the unwitting individual. The determinism
that underlies this view has, no doubt, played an important role in
shaping modern attitudes, but it is certain that, in its extreme form,
it does not command a consensus among Americans. Our legal sys-
tem and political institutions, our moral conceptions and even the
language we speak, reflect a belief that individuals make choices,
that human will is a reality. Without that belief, as we are recur-
rently reminded, our ideals of freedom and human dignity cannot
endure 13 Perhaps, as Sir Isaiah Berlin has written:
[I]t is a good thing that we should be reminded by social
scientists that human choice is a good deal more limited than
we used to suppose; that the evidence at our disposal shows
that many of the acts too often assumed to be in the individ-
ual's control are not so . . . .
Increased awareness of the limits of human choice "has led to...
exceedingly civilized consequences, and checked much traditional
cruelty and injustice."5 The existence of a domain of choice is,
nevertheless, the working assumption of our morality and institu-
tions. If that assumption has at times led to cruelty and injustice,
52 See J. RAWLS, supra note 41, at 310-12.
" See, e.g., B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971).
I. BERLIN, supra note 42, at 73.
Id. at 68.
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its abandonment seems likely to be even more pernicious.
If choice is possible, if human actions are not always deter-
mined by forces beyond individual control, it is meaningful to refer
to a class of characteristics-race, height, sex, illegitimacy and the
like-that are undeniably adventitious and immutable from the
perspective of the individual. The differential distribution of oppor-
tunities on the basis of such characteristics offends a commonly held
sense of justice because individuals who differ only in these respects
are not differently situated with reference to the social goal of en-
larging the ability of individuals to pursue a personal conception of
the good life. Only those differences over which individuals have
some control are relevant to that goal. The principle that classifica-
tion by involuntary characteristics counts against the validity of a
classification thus rests upon values that are central to our concep-
tion of the good society and therefore of the proper role of govern-
ment.
All that has been established, however, is that the use of such
criteria ought to count against the validity of a classification," not
that they are always impermissible. There are numerous situations
in which other values may call for discrimination by involuntary
characteristics. 7 At times, for example, the reward of desert is sacri-
56 The principle seems sufficient, nevertheless, to explain a decision such as Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), in which the Court invalidated the
provisions of a workmen's compensation statute that discriminated against illegitimate chil-
dren. The interests served by the classificatory scheme seem insufficient to overcome the
values expressed by the principle if the latter are to be accorded any weight at all.
57 Among the situations in which individuals are classified according to involuntary
characteristics are those in which special consideration is given the handicapped. See text at
note 44 supra. In this case humanitarian values seem to outweigh the principle that classifica-
tion by involuntary characteristics should be avoided. Special consideration for the handi-
capped may be viewed, however, as entirely compatible with the values that justify that
principle. An initial premise of the argument in support of the principle is that, except for
differences of desert, all persons are entitled to equal consideration of their claims to pursue
their own conception of the good life. One might argue that "equal consideration" does not
mean that equivalent resources must be devoted to all persons, but that some proportionate
contribution must be made to enable each individual to pursue his conception with an equal
chance of success. See W. FRANKENA, supra note 51, at 14-15.
A similar argument is sometimes advanced in support of minority preferences: because
of their disadvantages, minority group members must receive special consideration if a pro-
portionate contribution is to be made to enhance their opportunities to develop themselves.
See, e.g., the arguments summarized in Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the
Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 343,
379 (1974). The argument fails because not all members of minority groups are at a greater
disadvantage than all whites. See text and notes at notes 109-116 infra. If the goal is to
overcome "educational disadvantage," resulting from an applicant's family background or
prior education, many white students are certain to have as strong a claim as any member of
a racial or ethnic minority. And many members of minority groups, including some who offer
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ficed to a social interest in the meritorious performance of certain
tasks. Membership on the University of Michigan basketball team
is not equally open to all. The men who have achieved it have, no
doubt, demonstrated desire and effort. But no amount of desire and
effort would yield a place on the team to the many individuals who
lack the necessary physical attributes. We may regret the inability
of the latter to fulfill their ambitions, even lament that "life is
unfair,"58 but the fact remains that we prize the ability to play
basketball well more highly than the effort and desire to do so.
Now what is true of the University of Michigan's basketball
team is also true of its law school, as it is of other law schools and
of selective admission higher education programs generally. Tradi-
tional academic admissions criteria do not ignore desert-no appli-
cant who lacks desire or who has failed to make a substantial effort
is likely to meet the standards of admission-but they undoubtedly
exclude many who could not satisfy those criteria with any degree
of effort. Desert is thus sacrificed to a conception of social utility,
the perception of a social need for highly competent lawyers and
other professionals." If considerations of utility are sufficient to
overcome reservations about the use of involuntary characteristics
when competence is at stake, there is no apparent reason why simi-
lar considerations ought not to prevail in support of minority ad-
mission preferences. Unless race and ethnicity are required (for
some still unexplained reason) to be treated differently from other
involuntary characteristics," the only question is whether social
the greatest promise of success, would have to be denied preferential treatment. See text and
notes at notes 115-16 infra.
11 The "unfairness," of course, is not a product of nature, but of human choice, in this
instance the decision to prefer talent to effort and desire. There is nothing inevitable about
that decision, and at times we make a different choice, as in the "little leagues" that require
that equal playing time be allotted to each child who regularly attends practice sessions.
11 The implicit assumption is that the best index of future professional competence is
the quality of performance in the preparatory academic program and that the best index of
future success in the academic program is performance on admissions tests and in prior
academic programs. Although many educators are uneasy about these assumptions, there is
no reason to suppose that the assumptions operate to the special disadvantage of those racial
and ethnic minorities that currently benefit from special admissions programs. The potential
invalidity of the assumptions does not, therefore, justify preferential treatment of the mem-
bers of those groups. In any event, the meager available evidence suggests, contrary to the
initial assumptions of some proponents of racial preferences, that the standard predictors of
law school performance are at least as accurate for blacks as for whites, and perhaps more
so. See Schrader & Pitcher, Predicting Law School Grades for Black American Law Students
(Educational Testing Service Rept., 1973).
10 Competence is not the only value that justifies classification on the basis of involun-
tary characteristics. In San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), for
example, the Court sustained the validity of school finance systems that distribute educa-
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utility is served by minority preferences.
To the extent social utility is served, race and ethnicity may
even be seen as measures of competence." Competence is the ability
to perform a task in line with certain objectives. Those objectives,
in the case of educational institutions, are typically defined with
reference to some perception of social needs. Traditional academic
admissions criteria reflect a particular perception of those needs-a
need for students who will provide intellectual stimulation for other
students, for lawyers with a high degree of analytic capacity, for
physicians with an understanding of biochemistry, and the like.
Undoubtedly, these intellectual needs are of critical importance and
we depreciate them only at our peril. But they are not the only needs
of the society, as educational institutions have occasionally recog-
nized by tempering intellectual standards for admission with the
use of geographic preferences. In the same way, special minority
admissions programs may serve particular social needs.
It is sometimes argued that even if social utility is served by
such programs, they must nonetheless be held invalid because they
impose upon the white applicants who would otherwise have been
admitted too much of the cost that must be incurred to improve the
conditions of minority groups.2 The fallacy of that argument should
now be apparent. The burden upon the excluded applicant is real,13
but it is not different from the burden borne by applicants excluded
under traditional criteria. Moreover, it is imposed for precisely the
same reason, a judgment that the public welfare will be better
served by the admission of someone else. In that respect racial and
ethnic admissions criteria do not differ from traditional criteria that
are unquestionably constitutional.
The principle that government may not distribute burdens and
benefits on racial grounds cannot, therefore, be derived from a more
general rule that classification by involuntary characteristics is ei-
ther invalid or constitutionally suspect. Unless discrimination on
grounds of race and ethnicity is independently prohibited by the
Constitution, the validity of preferential admission standards for
minorities depends only upon a judgment that the public welfare is
tional funds unevenly among students on the basis of characteristics over which they lack
control. The decision resulted, in part, from the Court's willingness to give substantial weight
to the social value of decentralized decision-making.
" See Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REv. 955,
961-63 (1974).
62 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 57, at 388-89; Cohen, supra note 33, at 141.
Thus, there is no reason to question his standing to challenge the validity of racial
standards for admissions. But cf. Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975).
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served thereby. A final argument in support of the principle that
racial and ethnic classifications are prohibited by the Constitution
needs to be considered before examining the arguments that can be
advanced in support of such a judgment.
C. Discrimination Against Minorities: The Question of
Consistency
A constitutional principle that government may not distribute
burdens or benefits on racial or ethnic grounds is required neither
by the "intentions of the framers" nor by a more general principle
of constitutional law. Adoption of the principle would be required
therefore only if the principle were necessary to justify one or several
more particular decisions that the Court would feel compelled to
make." So, for example, if it could be shown that a constitutional
rule prohibiting classification on racial or ethnic grounds was neces-
sary to support the line of decisions invalidating legislation that
employs racial classifications to the disadvantage of blacks, 5 adop-
tion of the principle would be required.6 Posner's argument in sup-
port of the principle he proposes is cast largely in such terms. He
urges repeatedly that the same reasons often advanced in support
of minority preferences might also be put forth to justify discrimina-
tion against a racial or ethnic minority."7 Such a defense of the
"color-blind" principle, if it could be established, would be not
merely persuasive, but compelling. Consistency is not simply a
matter of intellectual elegance as some students of the legal system
appear to assume,6" but rather the critical test of whether decisions
serve a coherent set of values.
To justify Posner's principle in this way, however, it is not
sufficient merely to show that some of the reasons advanced in
support of minority preferences are incompatible with decisons pro-
hibiting discrimination against minorities. It must be shown,
rather, that some necessary ground for upholding minority prefer-
" See generally Feinberg, Justice, Fairness and Rationality, 81 YALE L.J. 1004, 1018-21
(1972).
,5 See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1880).
" Of course, another possibility is to overrule the earlier decisions. The commitment to
the decisions cited supra in note 65 is sufficiently great, however, that they must be deemed
a fixed starting point for any further analysis.
" Posner, supra note 2, at 12.
"4 See, e.g., Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1298 (1960); Wright, Pro-
fessor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L. REv. 769, 775-
83 (1971).
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ences conflicts with some necessary ground for invalidating discrim-
ination against minorities. Posner does not contend, however, that
these different uses of racial and ethnic classifications are wholly
indistinguishable; indeed, he acknowledges that "discrimination
against whites" is not "the same phenomenon as the sorts of dis-
crimination involved in previous equal-protection cases involving
members of racial or ethnic minorities . . . . I' The concession
seems unavoidable, if for no other reason than because of the
different social consequences of the current programs of minority
preference and the discriminatory legislation that the Supreme
Court has previously invalidated. The latter, to suggest only one
such difference, served to perpetuate the dominant status of a pre-
ferred group--in the case of Southern race legislation, to maintain
a virtual caste system-in a manner wholly incompatible with the
nation's evolving egalitarian ideals. Minority preferences plainly are
not subject to criticism on that ground. 70
Although Posner does not explicitly consider this distinction
between the different uses of racial and ethnic classifications, the
response he would make to it seems clear: whether or not the dis-
tinction has substance, the Supreme Court is not entitled to con-
sider it in applying the equal protection clause. A rule of constitu-
tional law, Posner contends, must be "sufficiently precise and objec-
tive to limit a judge's exercise of personal whim and preference."7
A rule that requires an assessment of the consequences of discrimi-
nation in order to determine whether the discrimination is constitu-
tionally permissible would, he argues, lack the necessary "precision
and objectivity" and thus be no more than "a directive that the
judges uphold those forms of racial and ethnic discrimination which
accord with their personal values. ' ' 72 Posner's argument thus rests,
crucially, not upon a claim that there is no difference between cur-
rent programs of minority preference in higher education and earlier
legislation discriminating against minorities, but upon a conception
of the judicial function that requires the courts to ignore differences
that do exist.
Posner's argument addresses an important problem. The purely
personal preferences of judges, all would concede, are not adequate
11 Posner, supra note 2, at 20.
11 See text and notes at notes 48-49 supra. There are, as discussed below, additional
grounds for distinguishing between current minority preferences and earlier legislation dis-
criminating against racial minorities. See text and notes at notes 81-86 infra.
Posner, supra note 2, at 22.
72 Id. at 25.
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reasons for judicial limitation of legislative power. Something else
is required. Yet Professor Bickel's assessment of the judicial career
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter serves equally well as a summary of
nearly two centuries of experience with judicial review:
• . . he never successfully identified sources from which this
[constitutional] judgment was to be drawn that would se-
curely limit as well as nourish it, he never achieved a rigorous
general accord between judicial supremacy and democratic
theory .73
The problem of identifying sources that will "limit as well as nour-
ish" judgment is especially acute in fashioning law under the equal
protection clause because, as developed earlier, the clause does not
reveal the values courts are to defend against legislative incursion.7 4
Absent a consensus concerning the appropriate sources of judgment,
there is an inevitable risk that judgment will turn upon the personal
preferences of the judges.
Precisely because that risk is unavoidable, however, its exist-
ence cannot be used as Posner attempts to use it, as a justification
for selecting one rather than another material principle for giving
meaning to the equal protection clause. Value choices necessarily
underlie the selection of one or another principle, and, absent socie-
tal agreement upon either the values or the source from which they
are to be derived, there is no escape from the risk that the principle
selected will reflect values personal to the judge. The principle Pos-
ner would have the Court adopt is, thus, neither more nor less
"objective" than a principle which would sanction minority prefer-
ences.
Posner himself comes close to recognizing this problem when he
considers the question whether the principle he proposes "is itself
subjective and arbitrary, because it does not explain why only race
and ethnic origin, and not all immutable or involuntary characteris-
tics" '75 are to be held impermissible bases of classification. His re-
sponse to that question is instructive. "There are," he writes, "two
grounds of distinction:
The first is one of necessity: if the constitutional principle were
defined in terms of all involuntary characteristics, it would
violate the requirement that a constitutional principle bind the
11 A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 34 (1970).
7, See text and notes at notes 6-12 supra.
Is Posner, supra note 2, at 23.
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judges. Since no one could argue that no involuntary character-
istic should ever be used as a criterion of public regulation, the
principle would give the judges interpreting it carte blanche to
pick and choose among groups defined in accordance with one
of the involuntary characteristics. Second, the grouping of peo-
ple by an ancestral characteristic is surely not the same pheno-
menon as, say, grouping by sex or age. A rule forbidding blacks
to work in mines, one forbidding women to work in mines, and
one forbidding children to work in mines, may all be discrimi-
natory, but one must strain to regard them as identical, in the
sense that if one is invalid, so, obviously, are the others. 71
Neither reason is persuasive.
The second point merely calls upon our intuition that race, sex,
and age differ from one another. Brief reflection will reveal, how-
ever, that whether or not they do depends upon the context in which
the question arises. Race and sex differ from age in that neither of
the former, in contemporary America, would be thought a permissi-
ble basis for differentiating among persons in determining the right
to vote or in formulating compulsory school attendance laws. Race
differs from sex and age, however, when the issue is liability to
compulsory military service: the latter, but not the former, would
generally be considered appropriate bases for classification. 77 None
of these characteristics would be thought a permissible basis for
determining liability to the thumbscrew: all persons would be
equally exempt because their common characteristics, for this pur-
pose, would be deemed more significant than their differences.
Context, thus, is of critical importance in determining the validity
of these criteria of classification. The reason for its importance is
that the consequences of employing one or another of the criteria
differ in different contexts, and it is by an appraisal of these conse-
quences that we determine whether the criteria are permissible
bases for sorting people.
Posner's first distinction implicitly rests upon just such an ap-
praisal of consequences. His conclusion that a court could not con-
sistently apply the principle that "no involuntary characteristic
should ever be used as a criterion of public regulation" appears to
rest upon a judgment that in some situations the prohibition of such
a criterion would lead to undesirable consequences. 78 His proposal
78 Id. at 23-24.
As these illustrations demonstrate, society's views concerning the permissible bases of
classification in various contexts are not static; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (proposed).
7 See text and notes at notes 43-45 supra.
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that the equal protection clause be read to embody an unbending
rule of "color-blindness," on the other hand, seemingly reflects a
judgment that a prohibition of the use of racial and ethnic critera
would not produce undesirable consequences. Now these judgments
may or may not be correct. Posner's apparent recourse to them,
however, is incompatible with his argument that the "color-blind"
principle is required because a rule permitting courts to consider the
consequences of racial and ethnic discrimination would be merely
"a directive that the judges uphold those forms of racial and ethnic
discrimination which accord with their personal values.""9 Unless
there exists some reason other than a differential appraisal of conse-
quences for distinguishing between race, ethnicity, and other invol-
untary characteristics-a reason Posner does not suggest-a rule
that prohibits use of the former but not the latter is, on Posner's
argument, no more than "a directive that the judges uphold those
forms of [discrimination on the basis of involuntary characteris-
tics] which accord with their personal values."8
Posner's effort to divorce constitutional principle from an ap-
praisal of consequences not only deprives the "color-blind" princi-
ple of its last claim to reasoned support, it ignores the fact that the
strong intuitive appeal of that principle is grounded in particular
historical circumstances. The idea that racial classifications are
wholly forbidden by the Constitution apparently took root in the
mid-1950s, in the effort to explain a series of per curiam decisions
that extended the rule of the School Segregation Cases" to all public
facilities.8" Other principles that would justify those decisions were,
no doubt, imaginable, but in the absence of any explanation by the
Court, a principle requiring government to be "color-blind," as
urged long ago by the first Justice Harlan,83 was both plausible and
attractive.84
, Posner, supra note 2, at 25.
" It might be argued that even though courts are free to consider consequences in fash-
ioning a constitutional rule, any rule so fashioned must not leave room for judicial appraisal
of consequences. Although this argument would justify the distinction Posner draws between
race, ethnicity, and other involuntary characteristics, it would also-contrary to his argu-
ment-justify the principle that government must be "color-blind" except where racial classi-
fications give a preference to designated racial and ethnic groups.
"1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
81 See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 906 (1956); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S.
879 (1955); Mayor & City of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
" Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
"' The Court's opinion in the School Segregation Cases rested heavily on the importance
of public education in the United States and the harm sustained by black children required
to attend lawfully segregated schools. "We conclude that in the field of public education the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
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A large measure of the attractiveness of the principle lay in its
responsiveness to the belief that the dignity and worth of individu-
als are unaffected by accidents of birth. "Jim Crow" legislation not
only withheld opportunities for the "pursuit of happiness" on
grounds wholly incompatible with that belief, it was an integral part
of a social milieu which systematically degraded and humiliated
people for reasons wholly beyond their control. A principle forbid-
ding government to classify by race would at least keep government
out of so dirty a business and, by depriving it of an apparently vital
support, perhaps end it altogether. Other values also seemed to be
served by the principle. Its adoption appeared to promise significant
improvement in the economically depressed condition of the black
population, for it would require that governmental benefits, a signif-
icant form of wealth in modern society, be equally available to all,
in fact as well as in theory. An end to enforced separation of the
races offered the additional hope that traditional prejudices would
be eliminated as blacks and whites came to know one another as
individuals, a prospect viewed by many as desirable not only as a
step toward realizing the cultural ideal of the "brotherhood of
man," but as a means of further reducing the barriers to the eco-
nomic and social advancement of the black population. These
hopes may now seem naive, but they were nevertheless crucial to the
emergence of the idea that government must be "color-blind."
By the early 1960s evidence had begun to accumulate that the
values that suggested the principle that government must ignore
race were not as harmonious as they had initially appeared. The
emergence of the issues of busing to achieve racial balance, benevo-
lent quotas in employment and public housing, community control,
and preferential admission standards for colleges and universities
signalled a growing belief that government could not simultaneously
treat race as irrelevant and achieve either integration or the eco-
nomic and social advancement of the black population. 5 Goals
which had earlier appeared consistent, even mutually reinforcing,
began to appear to be in conflict.
unequal." 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Since the Court's articulated rationale did not extend to
other public facilities, those who sought to comprehend subsequent decisions invalidating
state-imposed segregation of these facilities needed another explanation-a principle broad
enough to cover all public facilities, not merely schools. The Court's current doctrine, that a
law that classifies persons on the basis of race is "suspect," was not articulated until 1964.
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 187, 196 (1964).
" See, e.g., Bittker, The Case of the Checkerboard Ordinance: An Experiment in Race
Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality
for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363 (1966); Kirp,
Community Control, Public Policy, and the Limits of Law, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1355 (1970).
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To argue that constitutional principles must be formulated
without regard to such goals ignores the fact that it is precisely the
consideration of those goals that suggested the "color-blind" princi-
ple. The altered perception of social reality over the past two de-
cades-and the consequent need to reconsider the priority among
our goals-is, indeed, a classic illustration of Perelman's observa-
tion that "[any moral, political, or social evolution leading to a
modification in the scale of values will at the same time modify the
characteristics regarded as essential for the application of [the prin-
ciple of similar treatment for those similarly situated]. '"6 It is one
thing to maintain that people are similarly situated, notwithstand-
ing racial differences, when the consequence of doing so appears to
be the alleviation of suffering and the establishment of an inte-
grated society. It is quite another to do so when the consequence
appears to be precisely the opposite.
Professor Posner is right to point out, however, that there are
dangers associated with a principle that would permit race and
ethnicity to be considered if the anticipated consequences seem
desirable. "The necessary inquiries," he writes, "are intractable and
would leave the field open to slippery conjecture."87 If this overstates
the matter somewhat, the point is nonetheless important. Judicial
freedom to examine the consequences of a racial or ethnic classifica-
tion in determining its validity may also yield judgments disadvan-
tageous to minorities. The risk is unavoidable. Yet it is difficult to
understand Posner's conclusion that the "antidiscrimination princi-
ple is . . .more compelling when it is divorced from empirical in-
quiries into the effects of particular forms of discrimination on the
affected groups." ' Unless it is supported by an appraisal of such
effects, an antidiscrimination principle is not even persuasive, let
alone compelling. It is not, as we have seen, required by history, nor
can it be derived from a more general principle of constitutional law.
Whence, then, does it come? 9
" See text and note at note 26 supra.
" Posner, supra note 2, at 24.
m Id.
" We deceive ourselves, moreover, if we believe that decisions invalidating legislation
that discriminates against blacks or other minorities can be insulated from reexamination
by adopting a constitutional rule that unqualifiedly prohibits racial and ethnic discrimina-
tion. If the preponderant sentiment of the society should ever conclude that some such
legislation is desirable, it can be safely asserted that, insofar as they seem to stand in the
way, those decisions will be overruled, if not all at once then gradually, if not openly then
silently. An inflexible rule prohibiting discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds might,
conceivably, retard such a development, but that judgment seems hardly less conjectural
than those that are required in appraising the consequences of legislation that employs racial
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The University of Chicago Law Review
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR A MINORITY PREFERENCE
IN LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS
A decision whether legislation treats differently individuals
who must be deemed similarly situated for constitutional purposes
and thereby denies "the equal protection of the laws," requires a
prediction and appraisal of the likely consequences of the legisla-
tion. Legislation that employs racial or ethnic criteria is not subject
to a special constitutional rule. Its validity depends upon a judg-
ment about whether it will lead us toward or away from the kind of
society we want.
These are not only the conclusions that emerge from the preced-
ing analysis, they are also the clear teaching of Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education." Legislation that classifies chil-
dren by race to maintain racially segregated schools is impermissi-
ble. But classification by race is "within the broad discretionary
powers of school authorities" if "in order to prepare students to live
in a pluralistic society" those authorities wish to adopt a policy
"that each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white
students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole."'" The
difference is not in the criteria employed to classify students, but
in the Court's evaluation of the consequences of the two programs.
The one leads to a racially segregated society, with all that that
entails for the welfare of the black population; the other offers hope
of a racially integrated society and of a time when at least one
adventitious circumstance will have been removed as a barrier to
the "pursuit of happiness."
The validity of preferential admissions policies in institutions
of higher learning, similarly, turns upon a judgment about whether
the policies will contribute to or retard development of the kind of
society we want. The competing considerations have been so thor-
oughly canvassed in the literature92 that it would be pointless to
or ethnic criteria. See note 130 infra.
o 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
, Id. at 16. The quoted language is only dictum, but it seems to be a deliberate statement
of the Court's views and, therefore, dictum of substantial weight. Significantly, in approving
a racial classification for the purpose of achieving integration, the Court said nothing about
the "suspect" quality of racial classifications.
The attempt to distinguish preferential admissions programs from the policy approved
in Swann on the grounds that the latter neither imposes costs on whites nor discriminates
between blacks and whites is effectively refuted in Ely, supra note 2, at 724-25.
92 In addition to the articles cited elsewhere, see Graglia, Special Admission of the
"Culturally Deprived" to Law School, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 351 (1970); O'Neill, Preferential
Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J.
699 (1971); Symposium-De Funis: The Road Not Taken, 60 VA. L. REv. 917 (1974);
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state them at length. Instead, I want to develop briefly the reasons
that seem to me most persuasively to support preferential admis-
sions policies, primarily for the purpose of considering the argu-
ments that may be advanced against those reasons.13
Any justification of racial and ethnic preferences must begin by
recognizing that race and ethnicity are socially significant charac-
teristics. Many Americans, and especially those who are members
of the groups that have been the beneficiaries of preferential admis-
sions practices, live in communities and belong to organizations
that are defined in racial and ethnic terms. The direction of their
loyalties and of their sympathies is significantly determined by their
racial and ethnic identifications. Whether, or to what extent, that
is desirable is currently the subject of much debate; but whether it
is good or bad, it is a reality with which the law must contend. It is
not a matter of social indifference, for example, that the 12 percent
of those Americans whose incomes fall below the "low income level"
are not randomly distributed among the various racial and ethnic
groups but are disproportionately the members of a few racial and
ethnic minorities." This concentration of poverty has important
consequences in its impact upon individuals and in the prospects for
social stability. 5 Race and ethnicity are not, in other words, superfi-
Symposium-Disadvantaged Students and Legal Education-Programs for Affirmative
Action, 1970 TOL. L. REv. 277. These articles refer to much additional literature.
"1 The discussion that follows is cast largely in terms of law school admissions. With the
change of an occasional word or phrase, however, virtually all that is said is equally applicable
to other parts of the university. Although there are relevant differences between law schools
and other departments, it is almost inconceivable that different constitutional rules will be
developed for other parts of the university.
" BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 389, 394 (1975)
(Tables 631, 642). Income is not the only measure of well-being but it serves tolerably well
as a single indicator since other social indicators do not reveal a different pattern. Thus,
mortality rates at every age are strikingly higher for blacks than for whites, id. at 59 (Table
82); and educational attainment, as measured by schooling, is significantly lower for blacks
and persons of Spanish origin than for whites (including ethnic sub-groups within the white
population), id., at 34, 116-17 (Tables 41, 186-90).
,1 Posner argues that the interest in social stability is not a permissible justification for
minority preferences. Posner, supra note 2, at 26-31. In doing so, however, he blurs a critical
distinction. Starting with the premise that the risk of social instability is "never a legitimate
ground for refusing to apply a constitutional principle," he concludes that that risk is not
"entitled to weight in a constitutional analysis . . . ." Id. at 30. But these are very different
propositions. If there were a constitutional principle prohibiting classification by race and
ethnic origin, minority preferences could not be justified even though they were thought
necessary to the maintenance of social peace. But there is no such constitutional principle,
nor is there any basis for concluding that such a principle is required by constitutional
traditions. The question is whether such a principle ought to be adopted by the Supreme
Court. It is inconceivable that the Court should ignore the interest in social stability in
answering this question.
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cial aspects of "deeper" social problems such as poverty or inade-
quate education, but are integral to those problems.
In these circumstances, the question whether blacks and other
racial and ethnic minorities are substantially represented in law
school classes and at the bar assumes considerable importance.
Gross underrepresentation of these groups has consequences quite
different from those that would result from, say, the gross under-
representation of men with one blue and one green eye or of left-
handed women. Individuals who share these latter characteristics
do not identify with one another. Their associations are not signifi-
cantly determined by their common trait. They do not share a dis-
tinctive cultural background which may make it easier for them to
communicate with one another than with others. Governmental
decisions do not affect them differently than they affect other per-
sons, and, conversely, their views on issues of public policy are
likely to be distributed in the same way as in the general population.
In all these respects, individuals defined by these characteristics
differ from the members of racial and ethnic minorities. And it is
precisely because of these differences that gross underrepresentation
of the latter in law school and the bar poses a significant social
problem.
Consider first the educational responsibility of the law schools.
One of the objectives is to assist students in acquiring an under-
standing of the environment within which legal decisions are made.
It has been a familiar idea at least since the time of Plato that those
who govern need an understanding of the governed. The need is
common to all forms of government, but in a democracy it is critical.
Now lawyers in our society very frequently are cast in the role of
"governors," whether as public officials or as community leaders,
and in that role require an understanding of the diverse elements
which comprise the population. The need for such an understanding
is hardly less important to successful performance of the lawyer's
role in the representation of private interests, for without it efforts
to anticipate and influence official action are a good deal less likely
to be fruitful. It is inevitable that this understanding, so far as it
can be gained in an academic setting, will be acquired largely from
books. To a substantial degree, however, it is also acquired by inter-
action among students, through exposure to differing points of view
Posner's discussion of this issue blurs another important distinction, the difference be-
tween yielding to specific threats of violence and attempting to establish a social order which,
because of its responsiveness to the needs of the citizenry, is not likely to generate threats of
violence. The former, in all but rarest circumstances, must be considered deplorable, but the
latter ought to be considered one of the most important goals of social policy.
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in class discussion and in less formal settings. Diversity in the stu-
dent body contributes to student understanding of the variety of
views which exist in contemporary America and helps develop their
ability to develop and defend their own views. The absence of racial
and ethnic minorities in law school, or their presence in very small
numbers, "6 may significantly detract from the educational experi-
ence of those students who are admitted.
Professor Posner develops at some length an argument that
minority preferences cannot be justified by the desirability of a
diverse student body. "For a diversity argument to be convincing,"
he correctly maintains, "it must identify a differentiating factor
that is relevant to the educational experience." The only signifi-
cance of race, he argues, lies in its strong correlation with other
characteristics, like poverty, that arguably are relevant to diversity
in the educational experience. "Race in this analysis is simply a
proxy for a set of other attributes-relevant to the educational pro-
cess-with which race, itself irrelevant to the educational process,
happens to be correlated."" The use of race as a proxy, Posner
argues, may be "efficient" insofar as it reduces the costs of identify-
ing individuals who have characteristics that are relevant to the
educational process, but it is objectionable because it rests upon
and thus "legitimizes the mode of thought and behavior that under-
lies most prejudice and bigotry in the United States."9 If race and
ethnicity may be used as a proxy for desirable characteristics with
which they are correlated, he concludes, the same interest in effi-
ciency which justifies that use would permit them to be employed
as a proxy for undesirable characteristics, thereby justifying dis-
crimination against minorities.
The error of this argument lies in its failure to appreciate the
social significance of race, quite apart from its statistical correlation
"1 Posner somehow concludes that because the University of Washington Law School set
a target of 20 percent minority admissions, a percentage roughly equal to the proportion of
the specified minorities in the national population, its program could not have been moti-
vated by a concern for enhancing educational quality through diversification of the student
body. Posner, supra note 2, at 8. Posner is right that there is no "rational connection between
seeking proportional representation of minorities, on the one hand, and enhancing the quality
of the educational experience by providing some representation for members of minority
groups who could not gain admission on the basis of academic promise alone, on the other."
Id. at 8 n.18. It seems clear, nonetheless, that the number of minority students must be
substantial to serve effectively the educational objectives of diversity. Since the population
percentage figure may have been used as a convenient yardstick for substantiality, it is not
clear that Washington was unconcerned with educational quality.
'7 Id. at 9.
Id. at 12.
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with other attributes. Precisely because race itself is socially signifi-
cant, students need knowledge of the attitudes, views and back-
grounds of racial minorities. Posner is right to insist, although he
overstates the point somewhat, that there "are black people (and
Chicanos, Filipinos, etc.) . . . who have the same tastes, manners,
experiences, attitudes, and aspirations" as many whites.9 What he
ignores is that encountering that diversity is an important part of
the educational process. Well-intentioned whites, no less than big-
ots, need to learn that there is not a common "black experience"
and to appreciate the error of such statements as "blacks want
(believe, need, etc.) . . . ." Moreover, the distribution of attitudes
among blacks is not the same as it is among whites. And that too is
worth knowing. If the distribution of perceptions and views about
politics, or crime, or family is different among blacks than among
whites, that in and of itself may have important implications for
public policy.
The educational objectives of a minority presence in law school,
finally, encompass more than increased understanding of minority
groups. There is also a need to increase effective communication
across racial and ethnic lines. Many white students, for example,
need to learn to to be able to disagree with blacks candidly and
without embarrassment."' 0 I cannot imagine that any law teacher
whose subject matter requires discussion of racially sensitive issues
can have failed to observe the inability of some white students to
examine critically arguments by a black, or the difficulty experi-
enced by others in expressing their disagreements with blacks on
such issues. Yet, these skills are not only a professional necessity,
they are indispensable to the long-term well-being of our society.
Substantial representation of blacks, Chicanos, American Indi-
ans, Puerto Ricans (and perhaps other racial and ethnic minorities)
in law school student bodies is necessary also because more lawyers
are needed from these groups to serve adequately the legal needs of
their members. 0 1 The standard response to that claim, eloquently
11 Id. at 8. The point is overstated because it is hard to imagine a black person who has
entirely escaped the experience of being black.
100 Black students, of course, similarly need to learn to deal with whites, but my concern
at this point is with the educational experience of those students who would be in law school
without special admission programs.
101 For (dated) estimates of the number of lawyers from these groups see Edwards, A
New Role For The Black Law Graduate-A Reality or an Illusion? 69 MICH. L. REV. 1407,
1432-34 (1971); Gellhorn, The Law Schools and the Negro, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1069; Reynoso,
La Raza, The Law and the Law Schools, 1970 TOL. L. REv. 809; Strickland, Redeeming
Centuries of Dishonor: Legal Education and the American Indian, 1970 TOL. L. REV. 847.
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expressed by Justice Douglas in his DeFunis dissent, is that "[t]he
purpose of [a state university] cannot be to produce Black lawyers
for Blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, Jewish lawyers for Jews, Irish
lawyers for the Irish. It should be to produce good lawyers for Ameri-
cans .... ,,102 This is a compelling social and political ideaJ. Con-
stitutional law ought not, however, in the single-minded pursuit of
that ideal, ignore the existence of other values. Although it would
be absurd to suppose that only a Jewish lawyer can adequately
represent a Jew or that only a black lawyer can adequately represent
a black, it is true nonetheless that many Jews and many blacks (like
many persons of other ethnic and racial backgrounds) would prefer
to be represented by lawyers with an ethnic and racial identity
similar to their own. The satisfaction of these wants, absent strong
countervailing reasons, ought to be a permissible goal of public
policy. 0 3
In a society in which racial and ethnic identities play an impor-
tant role in everyday life, a lawyer's racial or ethnic background
may have an important bearing on his ability to serve his client.
Many of the tasks that lawyers perform for their clients require an
understanding of the social context in which the client's problem
arises. A brilliant and effective tax specialist is, for that reason,
unlikely to be an effective representative in a labor negotiation.
The reason is not simply that he is unfamiliar with the law of
labor relations, it is also and perhaps primarily that he lacks an
understanding of the practical problems of labor relations, of the
customs that have developed in dealing with those problems, and
of the style and manners of collective bargaining. To the extent that
racial and ethnic groups form distinctive subcultures within our
0 416 U.S. 312, 342 (1974).
103 Similar indulgence should, of course, also be shown for the preferences of whites or
Gentiles. As relationships become more personal, the case for individual freedom in these
relationships, including freedom to make "irrational" decisions, becomes stronger, a judg-
ment which is reflected in much existing anti-discrimination legislation. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e(b), 3603(b) (1970).
A conclusion that society can tolerate private discrimination in some settings, e.g., the
lawyer-client relationship, does not mean that society should tolerate discrimination in all
personal relationships. There is, no doubt, an important personal element in the relationships
within the student body, though not so personal as the lawyer-client relationship, but to allow
each student to select a school on the basis of racial considerations would, presumably,
reintroduce many of the baneful consequences of a segregated school system.
Distinctions such as these no doubt involve nice judgments and, therefore, certain dan-
gers. The goals of social policy are not likely to be furthered, however, by the adoption of
constitutional rules that foreclose such judgments entirely. The proper question is not
whether such judgments shall be made, but how and by whom. See text and notes at notes
119-46 infra.
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society, the representation of some of their members in connection
with some of their legal needs may involve similar difficulties for the
"outsider." The ability to "speak the language" of the client, to
understand his perception of his problem, and to deal with others
in the community on his behalf are qualities essential to being a
"good lawyer." These qualifications are more likely to be found
among lawyers who share the client's racial or ethnic identity, at
least to the extent that the client's life is bound up in a community
defined in these terms. 10 4
Admitting a minority group member to law school does not, of
course, guarantee that upon graduation he will practice law among
the members of his racial or ethnic group. But in light of the pat-
terns of American life, it seems virtually certain that a substantially
increased number of minority law graduates will mean a substantial
increase in the number who will serve the needs of minority groups.
Those who do take advantage of other opportunities ought not to be
counted as a social loss."0 5 The integration of blacks and other disad-
vantaged minorities into the larger economic, political and social
framework of the society continues to be an essential social goal.
Many of the blacks who join Wall Street law firms, corporate law
departments, labor union legal staffs, government agencies, or law
faculties, will retain a sense of identification with the black com-
munity and maintain ties with it. A black presence is likely to alter
the behavior of these institutions in a host of subtle and perhaps not
so subtle ways, making them more responsive to the varying needs
of the black community. No less significantly, the presence of blacks
in these institutions provides evidence to the black community that
important centers of American life are open to its members, evi-
dence that may exert a shaping influence upon the aspirations of
black children and may aid in the long-term acceptance by blacks
of the institutional framework of American society.
These latter considerations point to a final set of reasons for
increasing the number of minority law students and lawyers. The
special admissions programs which have been undertaken by the
law schools must be seen as part of a larger effort by the nation to
improve the conditions of life of some of its most disadvantaged
- Some white and some non-Hispanic people, to be sure, have these qualities to a
greater degree than some blacks and some persons of Spanish origin, but there are limits to
the precision that can be demanded of social policy. How, for example, are law schools to
determine which blacks or which persons of Spanish origin are insufficiently rooted in "the"
black or Hispanic communities to serve these purposes?
115 For a more complete development of this theme, see Edwards, A New Role for The
Black Law Graduate-A Reality or an Illusion? 69 MICH. L. REv. 1407 (1971).
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citizens. In part, that effort involves an attempt to accelerate the
growth of a "middle class" within certain racial and ethnic minority
groups. The justification for minority preferences within that overall
strategy is not difficult to discern: to the extent that racial and
ethnic identifications and loyalties continue to be important, there
is hope that the strengthening of the black, Chicano, or Puerto
Rican middle class through such preferences will have a catalytic
effect. Increased numbers of black and Hispanic lawyers and other
professionals should encourage the aspirations of black and His-
panic children.' A minority presence in the many settings in which
societal decisions are made seems likely to produce decisions more
responsive to the needs of minority communities. The organiza-
tional talent and financial resources of a minority middle class,
experience suggests, will to some extent be put at the service of less
advantaged members of minority groups. The hope, in short, is to
set in motion a chain reaction leading to the break-down of a com-
plex of conditions which today condemn large numbers of people to
lives of poverty and desperation.
Substantial representation of minority groups in the student
bodies of law schools thus serves a number of important purposes.
What must be understood is that if the law schools had adhered to
traditional admissions criteria, it would not have been possible to
obtain or even approximate the level of representation which has
been reached in recent years. 10 7 Nor is there any reason to anticipate
that those levels could be maintained in the near future under tradi-
tional standards."8 Opponents of racial and ethnic preferences gen-
erally concede this point, but argue that if the goal of increased
I" Posner argues persuasively that the need for role models does not require proportional
representation of minorities within a profession but only a large enough number to demon-
strate that the profession is open to members of the child's group. Posner's further assertion
that the number required for this purpose is unrelated to the size of the minority group is
quite wrong. The aspirations of children are influenced not only, and almost certainly not
primarily, by the models provided by the mass media but by adults with whom they come
into regular contact. The message that the professions are open to blacks, that a professional
career is a realistic aspiration, is less likely to be conveyed by occasional glimpses of a black
Supreme Court justice or cabinet officer than by observing a relative who is a lawyer, or a
neighbor who is a chemist, or whatever. The chances for observation of this sort are, ob-
viously, directly related to numbers.
"I See ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, LAW SCHOOLS AND
BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 36 (1975).
I' See Askin, Eliminating Racial Inequality in a Racist World, 2 Civ. LE. L. REv. 96,
99-100 (1975); Summers, Preferential Admissions: An Unreal Solution to a Real Problem,
1970 TOL. L. REV. 377, 378. None of the minority students who enrolled at the University of
Washington in the 1971 entering class would have been admitted had they been judged on
the criteria applied to all others. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 325 (1974) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
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minority admissions is to be achieved, it must be by some means
other than the use of such preferences.
The most frequently advocated alternative' is to reserve a per-
centage of each class for applicants from disadvantaged back-
grounds."' Blacks, American Indians, and persons of Hispanic ori-
gins would, it is anticipated, benefit from such a policy because a
disproportionate number of them come from such backgrounds, but
the policy would extend also to Appalachian whites or anyone else
from a disadvantaged background."' The effort would be to identify
those applicants who, through perseverance and other qualities, had
overcome the handicaps of their backgrounds, though not suffi-
ciently to meet the school's regular admissions standards. Of course,
no one knows how large a part of the entering class would have to
be reserved for admission on such criteria to obtain minority repre-
sentation roughly equal to that produced by existing programs."'
Clearly, the percentage would have to be considerably greater than
that which the law schools currently reserve for preferential minor-
ity admissions.13
109 Another possibility would be to select the student body randomly from those appli-
cants with LSAT scores and college GPAs above a minimal level. This proposal is subject to
all the objections raised in the text.
11 See, e.g., Douglas, J., dissenting in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 338 (1974).
"' The discussion which follows assumes that the proposal is put forth candidly and not
in the expectation that covert preferences would be given to certain racial and ethnic groups
in the administration of the policy. See Karst & Horowitz, supra note 61, at 972-74.
112 Because proponents of this position do not specify what kinds of background are to
count as "disadvantaged" it is impossible to estimate percentages. Family poverty seems to
be what most of the proponents have in mind, but it is not obvious why that characteristic
should be singled out. Many affluent children come from homes where the parents are alco-
holics, emotionally unstable, or otherwise unable to provide a background conducive to devel-
opment of a child's educational potential. Many poor children, conversely, come from homes
which provide the strongest sort of support for their educational development. An admissions
officer would have to determine whether a greater ability to overcome adversity has been
shown by the white middle-class suburban child of an alcoholic, wife-beating father or a poor
black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto. Should it, for example, count against the latter
(as demonstrating that his background was not disadvantaged) that he is the youngest of five
childrep all of whom have earned college degrees?
"1 Of the approximately ten million children who, in 1972, were in families with incomes
below the low income level, 57 percent were classified as white and 43 percent as "Negro and
other races." BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 389 (Table
631) (1975). If the definition of a disadvantaged family is extended to include families with
an income between 100 percent and 125 percent of the -low income level, another four million
children are added, three-quarters of whom are white. Id. at 390 (Table 633). Assuming that
applicants in this category are randomly distributed between whites and "Negro or other
races," the University of Washington would have had to use special admissions criteria not
for 15-20 percent of its entering class, as it did, but for 40-50 percent. If, on the other hand,
the University were to continue the special admissions program at the 15-20 percent level,
minority representation might be expected to decrease to between 5 percent and 7.5 percent
of the student body.
[42:653
Racial Preferences: The Judicial Role
The social cost of reshaping special admissions programs in this
way would be very great, involving exclusion from law schools of a
substantially larger percentage of the most talented students. That
cost alone should be sufficient to prevent such a plan from being
considered an acceptable alternative to existing special admission
programs. In addition, however, the proposal is not an acceptable
alternative because it is incompatible with the objective of achiev-
ing a substantial increase in minority enrollment. Existing special
admissions programs employ racial and ethnic preferences not only
in admissions but also in awarding financial assistance. If the for-
mer is to be held unconstitutional, so presumably must the latter.
Current minority enrollments at many institutions simply could not
be maintained, or even approximated, if financial assistance were
to be distributed in a racially neutral manner. At the present time,
it is not uncommon for minority students-comprising, say, 10 per-
cent of the student body-to receive 40-50 percent of all financial
assistance granted by their schools.114 If the number of students from
poor families who are admitted is substantially increased by use of
racially neutral admission standards for disadvantaged students
and if financial assistance is distributed in a racially neutral way,
the financial condition of virtually every university makes it certain
that substantially less money will be available to aid minority stu-
dents. The number of minority students would undoubtedly de-
crease.
Reshaping special admission programs to focus upon disadvan-
taged applicants, rather than upon minorities, would also force the
exclusion of some of the ablest minority applicants. It is reasonable
to suppose that a substantial percentage of the (not otherwise ad-
missible) minority applicants who have the best chance of success
in law school and the profession come from backgrounds that cannot
plausibly be considered disadvantaged.' Opponents of minority
preferences have found it especially galling that the child of a
wealthy and well-educated professional should receive preferential
treatment simply because of his or her race. But this objection is
well-founded only if the preference is seen as an effort to compensate
for the disadvantaged background of an individual. If preferences
are justifiable because they deal with the problems resulting from
the continuing social significance of race and ethnicity, there is
nothing unjust in awarding a preference to minority applicants who
"I O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REv.
925 n.2 (1974).
"I See note 57 supra.
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come from advantaged backgrounds. The preference is granted for
the same reason that preference is shown for exceptionally bright
applicants-a judgment that the qualities of the individuals admit-
ted are likely to make them more useful to society than those who
are excluded. " '
Racial and ethnic preferences are, thus, the most-quite possi-
bly, the only-feasible means of achieving substantial representa-
tion of certain racial and ethnic groups in law schools." 7 In light of
the important social values that are served by that representation,
the argument against racial and ethnic preferences would have to
be compelling to justify judicial adoption of a constitutional rule
denying government the power to employ them."'
I See text and notes at notes 57-62 supra; cf., Hughes, Reparations for Blacks? 43
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1063, 1072-73 (1968).
"I Professor Clyde Summers has argued that preferences do not actually increase the
number of minority students in law school, but only alter their patterns of enrollment. If the
preferences were abandoned, he maintains, minority students who are now preferentially
admitted to more selective institutions would be admissible under the normal standards of
somewhat less selective institutions. Summers, supra note 108, at 381-84. My impression,
from conversations with faculty members at other schools, is that Summers is overly optimis-
tic in predicting the schools for which minority students would qualify if preferential admis-
sions policies were abandoned. A substantial majority of the minority students admitted to
the University of Michigan Law School last year, for example, would not have qualified for
admission to nearby Wayne State University Law School under standards applicable to its
white students.
Knowledge of how far down the ladder minority students would have to go to gain
admission to a law school is important for several reasons. First, as Summers recognizes, the
more selective schools in general are the schools with the most resources for financial assis-
tance. Second, graduates of schools further down the ladder of prestige have far more re-
stricted job opportunities. See Edwards, supra note 105. Third, any assessment of Summers's
thesis must take into account how large a number of the most prestigious law schools, from
which many of the nation's future leaders are likely to be drawn, would lack substantial
minority representation.
Summers's argument does not, in any event, speak to the constitutional issue since, as
he acknowledges, absent a large infusion of government funds, racial and ethnic preferences
in the award of financial assistance must continue if minority enrollments are to be main-
tained. Id. at 398-401.
ii8 Even if the Supreme Court were to adhere to the notion that all racial and ethnic
classifications are constitutionally "suspect" (but see note 91 supra) the argument supporting
preferential admissions policies should be sufficient to sustain their validity. A conclusion
that a classification is constitutionally suspect triggers closer judicial scrutiny to assure that
(1) the interests served by the governmental action are of "compelling" importance, and (2)
there is no more precise means by which the government can accomplish its objectives. See,
e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 77 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). The latter
requirement, as the discussion in the text demonstrates, is plainly satisfied. Preferential
admissions policies are aimed with precision at their objectives. The difficult question is
whether that objective is "compelling." Precisely how courts are to make that judgment
remains a mystery, but it is hard to imagine that any policy would fail to qualify that offers
promise of contributing to a solution of the nation's most enduring social problems. Cf. Kahn
v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
[42:653
Racial Preferences: The Judicial Role
IV. POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE JuDIcIAL ROLE
Professor Ely also concludes that minority preferences in state
colleges and universities should not be held beyond the power of
government, but he reaches the conclusion by a quite different argu-
ment from that developed in the preceding pages. Curiously, his
argument raises what are, for me, the most troublesome questions
about the validity of existing preferential admissions programs. '
Ely's premise is the familiar view that in determining the con-
stitutionality of legislation courts owe less than normal deference to
legislative judgments when the interests of a minority are uniquely
threatened. Although he is seemingly prepared to have the courts
subject a legislative judgment to closer than normal scrutiny when-
ever any minority is singled out for disadvantageous treatment, 20
Ely employs the distinction primarily to explain why courts are
justified in examining with special care legislation that employs a
racial classification to the detriment of a minority. The reason, he
argues, is that there is less basis than normally exists to have confid-
ence in the legislature's assessment of the costs and benefits of the
legislation. When the impact of legislation is broadly distributed
through the society there is no reason to suspect inaccuracy in the
legislature's measurement of costs and benefits. Similarly, when
legislation distinguishes between two minorities (say, optometrists
and opticians), there is no reason to suppose that the legislature's
assessment of costs and benefits has been inaccurate. When, how-
ever, the costs and benefits of legislation are differentially distrib-
uted between a (racial) majority, to which most members of the
legislature belong, and a minority, the legislature's assessment of
these costs and benefits is likely to be distorted. The legislature's
exclusive identification with the group to which most of its members
belong, Ely contends, will tend to distort its assessment in two ways:
first, by leading it to overestimate the costs of treating the majority
and minority equally, and, second, by causing it to undervalue the
costs imposed upon the minority by the differential treatment. Both
of these risks are enhanced by the existence of racial prejudice.'21
This analysis leads Ely to conclude that there is no reason for
a court to view as constitutionally "suspect" a racial classification
"I The argument presented in this section requires a good deal more elaboration than is
possible within the confines of this paper. It is, however, of sufficient importance to the issues
posed by preferential admission policies that a sketchy treatment seems better than none. I
hope to develop the argument in greater detail in subsequent work.
' See Ely, supra note 2, at 734.
,2, Id. at 728-33.
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adopted by a majority "so as to advantage a minority and disadvan-
tage itself ....
A White majority is unlikely to disadvantage itself for rea-
sons of racial prejudice; nor is it likely to be tempted either to
underestimate the needs and deserts of Whites relative to those
of others, or to overestimate the costs of devising an alternative
classification that would extend to certain Whites the advan-
tages generally extended to Blacks. 22
The same argument leads Ely to conclude that minority preferences
are not constitutionally infirm.
Ely's analysis and the conclusions he draws from it are trouble-
some on several grounds. First, in American politics majorities are
rarely if ever monolithic." 3 Typically, political majorities are coali-
tions of minorities which have varying interests in the issue pre-
sented for decision. The real dispute is not between a majority and
a minority but between those minorities whose interests are most
immediately affected. Resolution of the dispute depends upon
which of the minorities is more successful in forging an alliance with
those groups which are less immediately affected.
The issue whether state schools ought to adopt preferential
admissions policies is no exception. The immediate beneficiaries of
these policies are the minorities which receive preferential treat-
ment. But there is no reason to suppose that the costs of such poli-
cies are borne equally by sub-groups within the white population.
To the extent that they are not, the discrimination-though nomi-
nally against a majority-is in reality against those sub-groups.'24
"' Id. at 735; cf. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 159
(1970): "[e]nactment of legislation favoring a minority may be treated as . . . a waiver by
the majority of its right to equal treatment."
- See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
121 Ely recognizes this possibility but ultimately fails to come to terms with it. The
concern that the burden of racial and ethnic preferences will fall disproportionately upon a
sub-group of whites has, as Ely notes, been particularly strong among segments of the Jewish
population. Ely responds to that concern by arguing that a policy of racial and ethnic prefer-
ences does not justify discrimination against Jews or any other group for those places in the
class unaffected by the preference. If the heightened pressure on admissions brought about
by racial and ethnic preferences leads to discrimination against Jews, the courts should
intervene on their behalf. Ely, supra note 2, at 736-38.
Ely's response is correct, as far as it goes, but it does not meet the real problem. Racial
preferences may disproportionately burden certain groups even though they do not lead to
overt or conscious discrimination against them. My own guess, and it is only that, is that
the primary burden of existing racial and ethnic preferences falls not upon Jews, but upon
the white working class whose children find it more difficult to obtain financial aid because
of the preferences given to minority groups. Whether or not distribution of the burden is
skewed in this way, there is no reason to suppose that the white professoriate primarily
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The fact that the costs of racial and ethnic preferences are not
equally or randomly distributed among the white majority is not,
by itself, a basis for constitutional objection to the preferences. The
costs of governmental policies often fall disproportionately upon
sub-groups in the society. In the absence of a constitutional norm
insulating a group from that burden, there is no warrant for judicial
intervention.ln The distribution of burdens and benefits is the cen-
tral function of the legislative process.
The legitimacy of the legislative process does not depend upon
the disinterestedness of the legislature, as Ely implicitly argues, but
upon its political responsibility. Legislatures are, no doubt, not fully
responsive to the wishes of the electorate-nor would we want them
to be-but their political responsibility is crucial to the democratic
ideal that governmental policies ought to respond to the wishes of
the citizenry. The legislature's political responsibility serves that
ideal in a number of ways. First, it provides a means by which
government is made more sensitive to the impact of a policy upon
the various segments of the society and thereby contributes to the
calculation of gains and losses resulting from that policy. Second,
since an appraisal of the consequences of policy involves not merely
a measurement of gains and losses, but a judgment of what is to
count as a gain or loss and how these shall be balanced, political
responsibility helps ensure that governmental policy will not depart
too far from the values of the citizenry. Finally, the political respon-
sibility of the legislature creates an incentive for compromise and
accomodation that facilitates development of policies that maxim-
ize the satisfaction of constituents' desires.
It is precisely these legitimating characteristics of the legisla-
tive process that lead to my doubts about the validity of existing
preferential admissions policies. Those policies are not the product
of a politically responsible legislative body, but of decisional pro-
cesses internal to the universities that have adopted them. Deci-
sions to employ racial and ethnic preferences have either been made
by faculties or by the governing bodies of the institutions. In either
event, the process of decision and the character of the decision-
making body are very different from those of legislatures, different
in ways that ought to make the courts a good deal less confident
about the propriety of those policies than would be justified if they
had been adopted by a legislature.
responsible for adopting preferential policies identifies more closely with excluded white
applicants than with the preferred minorities.
"1 See note 21 supra.
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A law school faculty, for example, is not well situated to acquire
information about the impact of its decisions upon persons outside
the law school community and the legal profession. Nothing in the
relationship of the faculty to the public makes it likely that the
faculty will learn whether a decision to grant preferences to certain
racial or ethnic groups imposes unduly heavy costs upon other
groups in the society or whether there are still other groups that
might plausibly lay claim to a similar preference. 12 Of course, law
faculties are not wholly insulated from outside pressures, but their
processes of decision are a good deal less likely than those of legisla-
tures to elicit such information. Faculties are, moreover, less con-
strained than legislatures by the need to obtain public consent for
their actions, creating a danger that the choices they make will
depart too widely from the values of the larger society. This danger
is enhanced by the fact that, for all their diversity, faculties are
relatively insular communities, subject to distinctive pressures and
a tendency to form distinctive outlooks upon issues. Encompassing
less diversity than the larger population, they are relatively more
prone to fall victim to those enthusiasms and waves of passion that
befall small groups'" and justify lodging decision-making authority
in larger groups.' 28
These considerations need not be a source of concern when, as
will normally be true, faculty decisions are made within the frame-
work of societal consensus, but they are a good deal more trouble-
some when, as in the case of racial and ethnic preferences, a consen-
sus does not exist. The absence of a consensus is of particular con-
cern because the question whether preferences shall be used poses
major value choices for the society. Minority preferences may, as I
have argued, serve deeply rooted societal values. But there is a risk,
the dimensions of which cannot yet be fully understood, that they
will do so at a significant sacrifice of other values.
One major area of concern is the impact preferential policies
may have upon the relationship among racial and ethnic groups. It
may be, as some have suggested, that "we can have a color-blind
society in the long run only if we refuse to be color-blind in the short
,"6 For an intimation that the University of Washington Law School did not even consider
whether Orientals should have been accorded the benefits of its preferential admissions
policy, see Morris, Equal Protection, Affirmative Action and Racial Preferences in Law
Admission: DeFunis v. Odegaard, 49 WASH. L. REv. 1, 50 (1973).
'2 The sense of William Buckley's familiar quip that he would rather be governed by the
first 2,000 persons listed in the Boston telephone directory than by the Harvard faculty
derives from such considerations.
12 Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
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run."' 2 But there is a danger that the use of preferences will exacer-
bate existing tensions in the society, both by creating resentment
against the preferred groups,13 and by buttressing existing identifi-
cations and loyalties. The current beneficiaries of preferential poli-
cies may have a compelling claim to them, but, given the incen-
tives, other groups may be expected to come forward with claims
that, to them at least, will seem equally compelling. Since groups
that currently benefit from preferential policies are no more likely
than the beneficiaries of other subsidies to relinquish them willingly
merely because the needs by which they were originally justified
have become less acute,13 the claims of other groups to similar
preferences are likely to become increasingly justifiable over time.
Significantly heightened racial and ethnic tensions would follow, as
various groups in the society vied for their "rightful share" of uni-
versity admissions and other social goods.
How seriously one takes these possibilities depends not only
upon an estimate of the likelihood of their occurrence, but upon
one's vision of the ultimate goal. All would agree that an intensifica-
tion of racial and ethnic identifications and loyalties to the point
where coexistence is threatened would be undesirable. Yet there is
currently a good deal of disagreement about whether social policy
should aim toward a fully integrated society-at the extreme, a
society in which all racial and ethnic identity is lost-or a multi-
ethnic, multi-racial society in which the lives of many individuals
would center upon their group identification. Adherents of one or
another of these positions (or of some intermediate view) are, one
suspects, likely to weigh the prospects of group conflict very differ-
ently.
More fundamentally, these positions reflect differing views
about the desirable organization of society and the place of the
individual in it. Movement toward a society organized along racial
and ethnic lines may be seen as posing a serious threat to concepts
of individuality that-though they have often been honored only in
'" B. BIrrTER, THE CASE FOR BLAcK REPARATIONS 120 (1973).
13 Kaplan, supra note 28, at 376. The danger is, arguably, increased by the fact that the
use of different admissions standards for minority applicants and others is likely to produce
students from the two groups of markedly differing abilities, thereby reinforcing stereotypes
of racial or ethnic inferiority whose breakdown is not yet entirely secure. Id. at 378; Graglia,
supra note 92, at 356. Although that danger ought not to be ignored, "[t]he question," as
Professor Ely wisely observes, "is whether the negative effects of using racial criteria to
overcome centuries of discrimination are so inevitable, and indeed so threatening, as to
outweigh the good that such programs may accomplish." Ely, supra note 2, at 739.
,31 Kaplan, supra note 28, at 376-77.
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the breach-lie at the base of American beliefs and institutions. 132
The extent to which the society will move in that direction will be
primarily determined by forces other than those set in motion by
preferential admissions policies, but, given the importance of the
universities in contemporary America, the policies they pursue are
likely to be a factor in determining society's direction.
These considerations do not, in my judgment, disturb the ear-
lier conclusion that the courts ought to reject a constitutional rule
precluding legislatures from adopting racial and ethnic preferences.
Balancing the dangers of these preferences against their potential
gains is a delicate, and ultimately legislative, task. There is no
warrant for the courts to draw the issue from the political forum.
The DeFunis case, however, did not on its facts require a judgment
about whether the courts should invalidate a legislative decision
sanctioning minority preferences, nor is it likely that the next case
to reach the Supreme Court will do so. Universities have adopted
preferential admissions policies without legislative sanction. The
precise issue that is raised, therefore, is not whether such policies
are valid when adopted by a broadly representative, politically re-
sponsible legislature, but whether they are valid when adopted by
a university.
Now it may be argued that the source of authority for minority
preferences is not relevant to the question whether they should be
held to violate the equal protection clause. The question whether
law school faculties are authorized to adopt preferential admissions
policies is, on this view, solely one of state law: the only federal
question is whether the preferential policies violate the equal pro-
tection clause, and courts must answer the latter question by pro-
ceeding as though the policies had been adopted by or received the
express authorization of the legislature. It must be conceded that
this is the conventional view of the matter'33 and that there is sup-
port for it in Supreme Court decisions.'34 The Court's decisions are,
however, less clear on the point than might be supposed. The Court
has at times indicated that the validity of action taken under the
authority of the state may depend upon whether the legislature has
made a deliberate and focused judgment that such action is an
132 Id. at 379-80; Posner, supra note 2, at 9-11.
133 See, e.g., H. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAV.
L. REV. 1, 26 (1959).
131 See, e.g., Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 77 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 463 (1957); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 386, 597 (1940), overruled in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (with respect to
Barnette, see note 143, infra).
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appropriate exercise of governmental power. '35
Although these decisions do not overrule the conventional view
that the constitutionality of action by a state must be determined
without reference to its source within the state, they are supported
by more persuasive reasoning. The latter view is based upon the
premise that the Federal Constitution does not control the distri-
bution of state legislative authority. The premise is sound, but it
does not support the conclusion drawn from it. 3 ' The issue is not
whether state legislative authority can be delegated, but whether
in determining the validity of state action that trenches upon con-
stitutional values, the courts ought to consider whether the judg-
ment under review is that of the legislature or of an agency that is
less representative of the public and lacking direct political respon-
sibility. 3
Minimally, whether challenged state action rests upon a legis-
lative judgment ought to be relevant to the degree of respect shown
by the court to the judgment.1 3 A commitment to democratic values
requires considerable judicial deference to deliberate legislative
judgments, rather more in my view than has been customary in
recent years. But none of the reasons supporting judicial deference
to legislative judgment support equal deference to the judgment of
a police department or a law school faculty. And only by ignoring
all that we know about legislative behavior could it be supposed
that a legislature's failure to limit the power of such bodies is equiv-
alent to affirmative legislative approval of their decisions.'39
The notion that courts ought to respect all decisions taken
under state authority as though they were the product of the most
careful legislative deliberation, if consistently applied, would un-
necessarily encroach upon constitutional values. Courts would be
"I See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251-55 (1975) (plurality opinion);
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236-
37 (1963); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 202-04 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670-71 (1925).
"I Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902), which has at times been cited in this
connection, merely rejected a claim that the state's Indeterminate Sentence Act impermissi-
bly conferred judicial power upon the executive branch of state government. The due process
clause, the Court held, did not impose a rule of "separation of powers" upon the states. Dreyer
may thus be read as standing for the proposition that the delegation of state legislative power
is not prohibited by the Federal Constitution. But it does not support the further proposition
that every exercise of state power must be judged under a uniform standard of review.
1' Cf. Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 692-721 (1964).
' See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67-98 (1969).
,' See, e.g., Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory
and Practice. 122 U. PA. L. REv. 810 (1974).
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required to sustain the constitutionality of governmental action
that, because of the political safeguards of the legislative process,
might fail to receive legislative approval. Conversely, if judicial de-
terminations of constitutionality are in reality influenced by an
agency's lack of political responsibility, the failure of constitutional
doctrine to acknowledge that fact candidly would lead to inappro-
priate restrictions on legislative power: a decision that certain ac-
tion is unconstitutional when taken solely on the authority of, say,
a police officer will be understood to mean that such action would
be unconstitutional even if sanctioned by the legislature. 4 ' In short,
both the adequate safeguard of constitutional values and appropri-
ate respect for legislative competence require abandoning the view
that all policy decisions are to be reviewed with equal deference;
regardless of their source.
The need for judicial attention to the political responsibility of
the source of allegedly unconstitutional state action is supported by
another and equally fundamental consideration. The blithe refer-
ences to "constitutional values" in the preceding discussion ought
not to obscure the fact that the values that receive constitutional
protection change over time. Constitutional law evolves to reflect
the changing circumstances and values of our society. Few would
wish it otherwise. Yet, after nearly two centuries experience the
courts have not succeeded in identifying sources of constitutional
judgment that will, in a phrase of Alexander Bickel's quoted earlier,
"securely limit as well as nourish it. 1 41 This failure stems from the
tension between the institutional mechanism that has developed for
giving meaning to the Constitution-judicial review-and the
democratic ideal that politically responsible institutions should de-
termine the direction of governmental policy. Quite possibly, that
tension can never be completely eliminated. It might, however, be
substantially reduced by the development of doctrines that place
primary responsibility upon the legislature for making critical
choices.12 When such choices must be made, the effort ought to be
1,* Cf. Burt, Miranda and Title II, A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81; Sanda-
low, supra note 137, at 685-92.
", See note 73 supra.
142 The familiar maxim that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional ques-
tions serves an identical purpose in relation to federal executive action. See, e.g., Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). The underlying notion is
not merely that Congress should not be assumed to have authorized action which trenches
upon fundamental values, but that in assessing the competing claims of important values
that have come into collision, the judgment of Congress is of critical importance. 360 U.S. at
506-07.
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to draw from the legislature, as the most broadly representative,
politically responsible institution of government, a focused judg-
ment about the appropriate balance to be struck between competing
values.' Once the legislature has made such a judgment, courts
ought to be extremely hesitant to upset it, for if the values to which
law gives expression are to change over time, the legislature's war-
rant for making the necessary decisions is a good deal stronger than
that of the courts. In the absence of such a judgment, however,
democratic values require invalidating an exercise of state power
that undermines values traditionally viewed as fundamental. The
cause of democracy is not served by allowing a subordinate state
agency to make such decisions.
These considerations frame the issues that are posed for the
courts by current policies of racial and ethnic preferences in univer-
sity admissions. There is no warrant for a judicially imposed rule
foreclosing legislative authorization of such policies. The difficult
question is whether those policies ought to be held to be within the
competence of a university. If the analysis advanced here were to
be adopted by the courts, the judicial answer to that question would
only determine whether the proponents or opponents of minority
preferences would bear the burden of seeking legislative action. Ul-
timate authority over a critical issue of social policy would be con-
signed to the legislature as the most broadly representative, politi-
cally responsible institution of government. A judicial decision con-
cerning the university's authority would, nevertheless have consid-
erable significance. Although neither proponents nor opponents of
minority preferences lack the means to force serious legislative con-
sideration of the issue,144 the difficulty of obtaining legislative action
,13 It is worth noting that in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), the Court rested in part upon just such a consideration in overruling its earlier decision
in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). In the earlier case, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the Court, had said that the decision of a local school board to require
children to salute the flag "must be viewed as though the legislature had itself formally
directed the flag-salute ... " Id. at 597. In Barnette, by contrast, Mr. Justice Jackson
wrote for the Court:
Such Boards are numerous and their territorial jurisdiction often small. But small and
local authority may feel less sense of responsibility to the Constitution, and agencies of
publicity may be less vigilant in calling it to account. The action of Congress in making
flag observation voluntary and respecting the conscience of the objector in a matter so
vital as raising the Army contrasts sharply with these local regulations in matters rela-
tively trivial to the welfare of the nation.
"I There are situations in which serious legislative consideration of an issue is unlikely
to result from the political process, as when the persons or interests adversely affected by a
governmental policy are too small in number to capture the attention of the legislature or
are so widely diffused through the population as to make the cost of political organization
prohibitive. In such cases judicial invalidation of the policy may serve a useful purpose by
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on so highly charged an issue would place the side bearing that
burden at an important disadvantage. Theoquestion for the courts
is which side ought to bear the burden.
The answer one gives to that question is likely to depend upon
how one reads our constitutional tradition with respect to racial and
ethnic discrimination. If that tradition is understood to flow primar-
ily from egalitarian values, a concern that government ought not to
contribute to the subjugation of minorities, there is little reason to
deny universities the power to adopt preferential policies. Existing
preferences seem likely to move the nation toward the goal of racial
and ethnic equality. Such preferences are likely to be seen as con-
trary to constitutional tradition, however, if the tradition is under-
stood to be rooted primarily in an ethic of individualism, a belief
that each individual ought to be judged solely on his own merit.'
The difficulty, in my view, is that neither alternative is entirely
accurate. Our constitutional tradition reflects both egalitarian and
individualist values because until recently the two seemed entirely
compatible. Now, for the first time, it appears (to many) that at
least in the short run a choice may be required.
In the absence of a guiding constitutional tradition, I would
conclude that two arguments call for a decision sustaining the power
of universities to adopt preferential admissions policies. The dispute
over racial and ethnic preferences involves a conflict between values
of a very high order. Such conflicts are never fully resolved. The
practical question is how far the society will move in one direction
or the other. Although the admissions policies of universities are not
a negligible factor in determining that direction, their ultimate im-
portance should not be overstated. There are many other points of
decision within the society, including private enterprise and other
government agencies. Moreover, the system of higher education is
itself highly decentralized. When a value choice of such magnitude
is posed, and especially when the need for choice has only recently
become apparent so that its dimensions are not fully understood,
there may be wisdom in allowing for a period of decentralized
affording the legislature a practical opportunity to speak to the issue. There is no reason to
suppose that either side of the ra~ial preference issue lacks effective access to the legislature.
"I It is a measure of the complexity of the issues raised by minority preferences that they
can also be viewed as a threat to egalitarian values, see note 130 supra, and as necessary to
the establishment of conditions that will maximize the opportunities for individual develop-
ment, see text and note at note 106 supra. The fact that both values can plausibly be invoked
either in support of or in opposition to preferential policies cautions against too ready accept-
ance of the common assumption that equality and individualism are at opposite ends of a
single continuum.
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decision-making. Universities have, in fact, responded to the de-
mands for increased minority enrollments in a variety of ways.
Some have adopted racial and ethnic preferences. Others have
adopted policies of preference for the disadvantaged without regard
to racial and ethnic background. Still others have adopted policies
of "open enrollment." Finally, some have maintained traditional
"color-blind" standards. This diversity of approaches may generate
a better understanding of the issues, permitting development of a
consensus which is now lacking.
The most compelling reason for sustaining preferential admis-
sions policies is that they offer hope of ameliorating the nation's
most enduring problem. The contrary arguments cannot be taken
lightly; racial and ethnic preferences do involve serious dangers. In
the end, however, a decision concerning their validity cannot avoid
a judgment about whether they are likely to contribute to or retard
development of the kind of society we want. In my own judgment,
for reasons already explained, the former is more likely. It would be
foolish to assert that judgment confidently, however. If the potential
benefits are great, so too are the potential losses. But in the light of
the seriousness of America's racial problem, the risk seems worth
taking, however uncomfortable we may be with it.
So speculative and personal a judgment is a weak foundation
for judicial interpretation of the Constitution. Yet, a contrary deci-
sion would necessarily rest upon predictions that are equally conjec-
tural and, therefore, equally personal. If judges are uneasy about
resting constitutional interpretation upon such foundations, the
remedy is not to fashion principles that mask the underlying
choices. The remedy, rather, is candidly to avow the choices that
must be made and to develop doctrines that consign ultimate au-
thority for those choices to the legislature, where in a democracy it
rightly belongs.'46
,,6 Of course, even on a conventional constitutional analysis, a decision sustaining exist-
ing minority preferences would have that effect.
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